Mehdi Rezaei; Rooholla Alidadzadeh
Abstract
One of the manifestations of rule of law is constitutionalism that entered into legal-political arena in the 18th century. Henceforth, many countries have considered the Constitution as the main manifestation of constitutionalism. Accordingly, Algeria and Iran had their own Constitution in 1963 and 1906 ...
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One of the manifestations of rule of law is constitutionalism that entered into legal-political arena in the 18th century. Henceforth, many countries have considered the Constitution as the main manifestation of constitutionalism. Accordingly, Algeria and Iran had their own Constitution in 1963 and 1906 respectively for the first time. Their Constitutions needed support from a superior independent institution. The first Algerian Constitution appointed constitutional council as centralized and expert institution to take charge of basic hearing. However, the first Iranian Constitution embraced sharia hearing institution and basic hearing was not in Iranian Constitution until 1979. In general, the nature at basic hearing divided into political and legal parts. The structure of this research is based on the aforementioned classification. The main object of the research is to demonstrate the nature of basic hearing in Algeria and Iran by using documentary method to analyze and to explain the nature of institution that supervises the execution of the Constitution. The results show the multi–dimensional nature of these two institutions.
Mohammad Javad Javid; mostafa Shafizadeh Kholenjani
Abstract
Nowadays, it is very common to simply talk about the "relativity" of human rights. Perhaps this relativistic approach might be the unintended consequence of a situational looking at human rights. Since there is no common and correct boundary between the human rights and civil rights, it has inevitably ...
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Nowadays, it is very common to simply talk about the "relativity" of human rights. Perhaps this relativistic approach might be the unintended consequence of a situational looking at human rights. Since there is no common and correct boundary between the human rights and civil rights, it has inevitably fallen into the trap of relativism that had been opposed to its primary and universal objective. This boundary which paves the way for any relativistic interpretation of international instruments makes the assumption of the present article. Therefore, given the relativity of human rights, it may not be deemed universal. To this end, this paper goes on to establish a universal law based on the recognition of an anthropology of human rights in which in every age and every place, the essence of human nature is deemed.
