Public Law
Hamed Nikoonahad; Marzye Mohammadabadi
Abstract
IntroductionAccording to the principle of the hierarchy of norms, legal rules can be represented as a pyramid, with the Constitution at the top as the superior law. However, the Constitution is not immune to violations by subordinate norms, making it essential to take measures to protect the Constitution. ...
Read More
IntroductionAccording to the principle of the hierarchy of norms, legal rules can be represented as a pyramid, with the Constitution at the top as the superior law. However, the Constitution is not immune to violations by subordinate norms, making it essential to take measures to protect the Constitution. Without an effective mechanism to uphold its authority, the Constitution risks losing its effectiveness. In Iran’s constitutional system, the Guardian Council is designated as the competent authority responsible for ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution in the legislative process, as outlined in Article 91 of the Constitution. This council is tasked with reviewing legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly to ensure it does not conflict with the Constitution. However, the Council’s supervisory role is neither comprehensive nor essentially adequate, leading to shortcomings in ensuring the Constitution’s supremacy. These shortcomings primarily stem from constitutional principles, amendments, or gaps therein. This research aimed to identify these shortcomings by analyzing the Guardian Council’s supervisory procedures over the ordinary law. The central research question is, what are the shortcomings and challenges faced by the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution over ordinary law? Literature ReviewThere are several studies on the Guardian Council’s supervision over the ordinary law. One notable work is the Persian-language book titled Monitoring Legislation in Iran and the United States (Safaie & Hamidiyan, 2010), which examines legislative oversight in both countries. In “The Guardian Council and Review of Laws,” Mehrpour (1993) discussed how the Guardian Council supervises parliamentary approvals. However, Mehrpour did not specifically analyze the limitations or shortcomings of the Council’s supervision over the ordinary law. The existing studies also analyze the Guardian Council’s performance in reviewing parliamentary resolutions, focusing on their compliance with the Constitution in terms of quantity and quality. Additionally, some research has examined the Guardian Council’s supervision of parliamentary resolutions in relation to higher-level legal documents, providing an explanation and analysis of the Council’s legal status as an autonomous agency operating independently of the three branches of government. Discussion have explored the Guardian Council’s position and competency in reviewing parliamentary approvals. Key issues of Article 94, the definition of parliamentary approval, the Council’s a priori supervision of legislation, and the ten-day review period were also examined and analyzed. The existing literature has primarily focused on the foundations of the Council’s formation and its approach to supervising the ordinary law. However, it seems no serious research has coherently addressed the shortcomings inherent in the Council’s supervisory mechanisms. Materials and MethodsAdopting a procedural research design, the present study aimed to offer a legal analysis of the shortcomings in the Guardian Council’s supervision over the ordinary law, as well as to propose solutions to address these issues. The study is based on a key premise that it is necessary to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and establish a systematic mechanism to uphold it. Results and DiscussionThe analysis focused on the procedures and opinions of the Guardian Council in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution. The results revealed that the mechanisms established for its supervision of the ordinary law are not comprehensive. In practice, these shortcomings have caused disruptions in the constitutional decision-making system. One such issue is that the Guardian Council is required to determine whether parliamentary approvals contradict the Constitution within a limited timeframe. This restriction, set forth in Article 94, is not always effective—especially in cases where council members require more time for review, such as budget-related or large-scale approvals. Even with the 10-day extension allowed under Article 95, this constraint remains problematic. Furthermore, the Guardian Council’s supervisory authority is limited to approvals issued by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and does not extend to those made by other legislative bodies that operate in line with the law. These limitations result in constitutional requirements being overlooked and the incorporation of ordinary laws that contradict the Constitution into the legal system. These issues highlight the need to revise and reform the mechanisms of the Guardian Council’s supervision over the ordinary law. Given that Article 94 of the Constitution aims to prevent the introduction of unconstitutional laws into the legal system, this goal can only be fully achieved if the Guardian Council is granted the authority to oversee all ordinary laws. To protect the Constitution, it is essential for the Guardian Council to have the authority to declare laws inconsistent with the Constitution invalid. ConclusionIt is recommended that Article 95 of the Constitution be amended to grant the Guardian Council the authority to declare laws inconsistent with the Constitution invalid, even after the deadlines for issuing opinions have passed and during their implementation. In addition, the Guardian Council could expand its supervisory powers by adopting an eschatological interpretation of Article 94, allowing it to review and assess the conformity of laws with the Constitution even after they have come into effect.
