Kant and the Ttransition from Natural Law to Rational Law A Reflection on Transcendental Positivism as the Basis of the Validity of Law

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Associate Professor, Private Law, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

10.22054/qjpl.2026.83428.3064
Abstract
The difference between classical natural Law and Kant's rational Law should be found in the difference in their view of human beings, as the source of the validity of the principles and propositions of law. Human nature, in the Aristotelian approach, has a phenomenal nature; However, the principle of the sovereignty of the will, the Categorical imperative and the necessity of following it and the principle of individual freedom as the principle of the subject of practical rationality, is a form, and for this reason, both from the point of view of determining the content and from the point of view of the guarantee of implementation, in the domain regulating social relationships face a challenge. Positivism is a solution to solve this challenge. However, making compatibility between positivism and the aforementioned noumenons, especially with regard to the role it plays in solving the above-mentioned challenge, is another problem. Can Kant's transcendental positivism be a reliable theoretical framework for this compatibility? Is the advancement of practical rationality over theoretical rationality preserved by this type of positivism, or should Kant's transcendental positivism be called his second Copernican revolution? A revolution that is not necessarily compatible with the first revolution?

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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 07 September 2026