Introduction

The freedom of assembly and procession is a fundamental civil and political right recognized in numerous human rights documents and legal systems, including that of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). The question arises as to what specific stance the IRI’s constitutional law takes on this kind of freedom. In this respect, the current study aimed to clarify the relationship between Principle 27 of the Constitution and other principles. Using a jurisprudential and legal analysis, the research sought to examine the position of Principle 27 within the broader context of the IRI’s Constitution. The analysis was to evaluate the right to assembly and procession in the Iranian legal system, offering insights into the ideal legal standard for freedom of assembly and procession.

Literature Review

The Persian legal literature provides valuable but limited research on this topic, highlighting a notable gap in analytical approaches to examining the issue. To address this gap, the present study employed an analytical framework grounded in jurisprudential and legal analysis. 

Materials and Methods

As a qualitative inquiry, the present study used a library research method to collect the data. Moreover, a jurisprudential and legal analysis was conducted to analyze the data and examine the position of Principle 27 within Iran’s constitutional law.

Results and Discussion

The findings revealed several key insights. First, Principle 27 of the Constitution of the IRI, grounded in religious teachings and aligned with international and regional human rights documents, it recognizes the right to freedom of assembly and procession with minimal restrictions. Second, understanding the absolute right embedded in Principle 27 within Iran’s broader legal framework requires a holistic view of the Constitution and an assessment of how it relates to other constitutional principles. The analysis of this relevance revealed the universality of the right to freedom of assembly for all citizens, showing that it extends beyond the two specific restrictions stated in Principle 27. Finally, a review of domestic legal documents and executive procedures revealed contradictions with the theoretical field of constitutional rights in Iran. These legal frameworks, contrary to the constitutional perspective, adopt a permit-based approach that is notably stricter than similar systems in other permit-based legal systems. Moreover, the study advanced the argument that the lack of legislation on the part of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Iranian Parliament)—concerning the right of all citizens to hold assemblies and processions—does not render such gatherings illegal. If an assembly or procession does not conflict with the governing laws within the legal framework of the IRI, it is considered legal under Principle 27 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

A holistic view of the Constitution requires that the right to freedom of assembly and procession outlined in Principle 27 be considered in conjunction with other constitutional principles. The application of Principle 27, which is subject to two specified restrictions, falls under the jurisdiction of ordinary law tasked with determining issues such as the implementation procedures, conceptual scope, mechanisms for ensuring compliance, and guarantees against violations. In this context, valuable insights can be gained from historical interpretations, such as an analysis of the debates among members of the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution, to reveal the intent behind drafting Principle 27 as well as the historical, political, and social contexts at the time. Additionally, early experiences and real-world implications of either overly broad or overly restrictive interpretations are crucial for establishing the right to assembly and procession. These insights can inform the principles and conditions necessary for relevant legislation that can effectively embody this fundamental right, helping to institutionalize, stabilize, and strengthen it in future legal procedures.
There are several important points to mention. First, the freedom of assembly and procession recognized in the Constitution is incompatible with the permit system. On the one hand, it is essential to uphold the universality of this freedom, which should not require obtaining permission for its exercise. On the other hand, the reluctance of the members of the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution to specify restrictions that would put the fate of assemblies in the hands of the government suggests that it is not feasible to orient Principle 27 of the Constitution toward a permit-based approach through ordinary law. Second, the right to assemble should not be restricted to a specific group. Principle 27 recognizes the right to assembly as a civil and political right for all citizens. Limiting this right to certain groups, such as legal political parties, contradicts the meaning and rationale of this principle outlined in the Constitution. Third, there should be maximum reservations regarding the prohibition of gatherings. In cases where a gathering or procession conflicts with restrictions such as public order, the legislator should refrain from declaring a ban or dispersing the gathering as the first response; this should only be done as the last resort. It is important to emphasize that the freedom of assembly must be protected to the greatest extent possible. Any restrictions should be imposed only to the extent necessary to manage the situation, rather than resorting to prohibitions as an immediate response. Fourth, clarity in the text of the law is essential. This principle, which generally governs the drafting of legislation, should also apply to laws related to Principle 27. Specifically, any interpretable limitations—such as the cases causing disturbances to the foundations of Islam—should be clearly defined in the law. Failing to do so will undoubtedly create problems for citizens in exercising their rights and may hinder the administrative police and judicial officials in fulfilling their duties. By precisely specifying all processes and avoiding vague language, the rights of all parties can be effectively protected from violations.