Introduction

Since its establishment in France in 1800, the governorate has served as the state’s high representative and the guarantor of the unity of the state and the nation within the territorial boundaries. Later on, the Iranian legislature also adopted the fundamental principles of the French governorate system. These principles were incorporated into Iranian legal and political literature through two key laws: the Country Divisions Law of 1937 (1316 S.H.) and the Law on Determining the Authority of Governors enacted in 1960 (1339 S.H.). The primary purpose of this institution is to represent the central government at the local level and to coordinate administrative departments in implementing the government’s public policies.
There is an ongoing concern about how the division of duties and authorities has evolved over time. In recent years, high-ranking officials in Iran—including the President, ministers, and governors—have officially highlighted the inadequacy and imbalance between the authorities and responsibilities of governors, calling for an expansion of their powers. However, two key issues remain somewhat unclear. First, it is not precisely defined which specific jurisdictions are limited in terms of the governor’s authority. Second, the strategies adopted by Iran’s central government to create a better balance between central and local powers have yet to be clearly articulated. Relying on a comparative analysis, the present research aimed to examine the new role of governors under French law, where it enjoys a relatively balanced position. It tried to compare the French system with the legal norms in Iran and to propose a more effective model for enhancing the accountability of governors in implementing the central government’s public policies in Iran. The analysis focused specifically on the outcomes of decentralization and its impact on the authorities and duties of governors. With the support of various legal texts and by adapting to evolving practical procedures, governors exercise a new form of authority over non-centralized sectors—those subject to deconcentration. This is an area where the French innovations are largely absent from Iranian law. The research sought to address the following questions: Is there a need to expand the authority of governors in the context of Iran’s non-centralized system? If so, in which areas and through what means and instruments should this authority be expanded?

Literature Review

In the Persian legal literature, there is a noticeable lack of comprehensive sources that examine the authority of governors within the processes of decentralization and deconcentration. Yet there are a few relevant studies. For example, in the article “A Review of Local Governance Organization in Iran: Legal and Administrative Challenges and Solutions,” Shams (2017) focused on the historical development of administrative styles in Iran and explained the factors driving Iranian officials toward centralization. The article titled “A Comparative Introduction to the Territorial Decentralization in Iran” (Aghaei Toogh, 2018) explored three key elements of local decentralization in Iran and France: legal personality, the general competence of local decentralization authorities in France, and the elective nature of decentralization authorities in both countries. While both studies provide valuable insights, their points of focus differ significantly from the current research.

Materials and Methods

The current research began with an analysis of legal texts, as they form the foundation for understanding the principles that govern deconcentration processes. Several key laws and regulations that had contributed to deviations from previous frameworks were examined and evaluated. However, these legal norms do not necessarily provide a complete or accurate picture of the governor’s current position and


powers. It seems that governors need to develop an understanding of legal norms and align themselves with them in order to lay the foundations for their new role. Nevertheless, practical procedures and customary practices must not be overlooked, as they play a crucial role in the actual exercise of the governor’s special prerogatives and are deeply intertwined with them.

Results and Discussion

Just as the highest executive authority at the national level is responsible for ensuring administrative and political coherence and serves as the core of governmental power (the dignity of the presidency), the governor at the provincial level carries duties and authorities that closely resemble those of the highest political authority. The governor acts as the guarantor of unity between the state and the people within the province. The current study comparatively examined the question of what authorities a governor should have to fulfill these critical responsibilities and implement the government’s public policies in the province. In France, the issue of the governor’s insufficient authority has never been a point of contention. Instead, since the early 1980s, the focus has been on expanding decentralization programs and enhancing the duties and authorities of local–council institutions. A significant number of duties and authorities previously held by the central administrative system have been transferred to these local institutions. As a result, the governor, on behalf of the central government, no longer directly intervenes in these areas. Instead, the governor’s role has shifted from that of an executor to one of supporting and promoting projects. One of the most complex aspects of the governor’s duties is their


 influential role in relation to local institutions. In this respect, the governor’s significance extends beyond legal and organizational powers; they also serve as a communicative bridge, with the potential to initiate special initiatives through interactions with local representatives. A key example of this role is found in the government–region contracts and projects in France. Thanks to this role, local institutions often view the governor as a supporter of their development programs.

Conclusion

The research findings suggested that the authority of governors in Iran over local non-centralized institutions is not only insufficient but also requires significant reform to increase their power and supervision capacity. Such reforms are necessary for governors to effectively coordinate the various institutions established in the region (decentralization).  Another key finding is that the role of governorate is both complex and unclear. The solution lies in adaptability and continuous innovation, rather than merely expanding legal authority. The procedures, continuity, and stability in the central government’s efforts to strengthen decentralized institutions, particularly the role of the governor, are likely to yield more tangible results than simply modifying or enhancing legal instruments. Moreover, given the complexity and multifaceted nature of the governorate, the government should give greater consideration to the selection of governors and their qualifications. A comprehensive transformation in the scope of decentralization in Iran—while also reducing the governor’s authorities in this area—could create an opportunity to enhance the governor’s ability to promote coherence among central institutions in the province. This transformation could enhance the governor’s capacity to foster greater cohesion among central institutions in the province.