Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Ph.D Student, Public Law, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran
2 Professor, Department of Public International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran
Abstract
Introduction
Concreteness is one of the most important aspects of Hegel’s philosophy. According to Hegel, a concept is empty and philosophically insignificant unless it is realized, and only when the concept is fully realized can it be considered an idea. The concept of the constitution, a key element in constitutional law, is typically understood in an abstract manner. However, Hegel’s emphasis on the concrete approach offers a powerful framework for freeing this concept from abstraction, determining it based on concrete thought. The abstract view of the constitution has dominated Iran’s constitutional laws in the modern era, with contemporary constitutional frameworks being shaped by this abstract perspective. Therefore, revisiting the concept of the constitution through the lens of Hegel’s absolute idealism provides a suitable foundation for concrete conception of Iran’s modern constitutional law.
Literature Review
There is no serious research directly addressing the problem of the present study. However, a few studies touch upon the concept of the constitution in Hegel’s philosophy. For instance, the article “On the Notion of Constitution in Hegel” (Bobbio, 1980) categorized the positive and negative elements of the concept of constitution according to Hegel’s thought. Yet, the author argues that this categorization of positive and negative elements diverges from the spirit of Hegel’s words and his dialectical method, including his concrete approach. In addition, Hegel’s ideas on freedom, the state, and the constitution are the main topics in “Idealism and the Idea of a Constitution” (Thornhill, 2013). However, Thornhill’s research does not focus on Hegel’s concrete approach. Similarly, in “Hegel’s Idea of the State,” Houlgate (2019) examined the concept of the constitution in the context of Hegel’s notion of the state, but he did not address the concreteness of the constitution. Additionally, Martin Loughlin, a foundational thinker in public law, touched on Hegel’s approach in Fundamentals of Public Law (Loughlin, 2010)) and “In Search of the Constitution” (Loughlin, 2019). While Loughlin discusses Hegel’s perspective on the constitution, his treatment of the concept differs from the approach taken in the present article. Frederick Beiser, a prominent Hegel scholar, did not offer a detailed discussion on the constitution in his book Hegel (Beiser, 2002). While Beiser addresses some Hegelian concepts (e.g., the state), the concept of constitution is mentioned in passing, without direct attention to Hegel’s concrete approach in relation to the constitution. This also holds true of other works published by commentator of Hegel. It is thus evident that there is a gap in literature regarding the concept of the constitution from the perspective of public law foundations, particularly with respect to its concreteness and implications in constitutional rights.
Materials and Methods
Grounded in the principles of public law (i.e., fundamental rights), the present study adopted an analytical approach consisting of theoretical and philosophical analysis. More specifically, since the nature and scope of the research topic is rooted in Hegel’s methodological approach, as elaborated in The Phenomenology of Spirit, the analysis sought to adhere to this framework, rather than focusing on the abstract philosophical analysis of the constitution. The approach to understanding the concept of the constitution was thus inferred from the concrete in the context of the evolution of spirit in history.
Results and Discussion
The common approach in constitutional law defines the concept of the constitution in abstract terms, often presenting it as a legal source in document form. This contrasts with Hegel’s idealism, which adopts a different perspective on concepts. According to Hegel, concepts should be concrete, as abstract concepts are seen as empty and devoid of truth. Rather than providing an a priori definition of the constitution, Hegel suggests that one should seek to infer the constitution in the context of the evolutionary history of a nation. From this standpoint, imposing a constitution on a nation is futile. It is not desirable for a nation’s elites to formulate a constitution for that nation at an ideal level, as this would not reflect the true constitution of the nation. The constitution, as the soul of the nation, must embody the real manifestation of the nation’s thought and action within the context of history. The constitution of fundamental principles represents the final stage of a nation’s historical evolution. This last stage of evolution culminates in the establishment of the state, making the constitution, in Hegel’s view, the foundational principle of the state.
Conclusion
The findings put forward the argument that the conventional view of the constitution in terms of constitutional rights is a product of the abstraction of the mind, particularly when compared to the instances of constitutions formed in the modern period during the establishment of nation–states. In contrast, the concrete approach to the constitution looks at the concept before its specific instances. From this perspective, the concrete concept of the constitution is not simply a collection of common instances derived from abstracting the similarities between constitutional instances. Rather, it represents the foundational concept upon which these instances are based, with the instances evolving alongside the concept as they manifest in the external reality. Without a concrete concept of the constitution, the a priori definition of the constitution, based solely on an abstract perspective, remains a one-dimensional concept devoid of truth, which can be dismissed because of being arbitrary or unstable.
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