Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PHD student of public law University of tehran -farabi campus

2 Associate Professor, Public Law, University of Tehran, Farabi Campus, Faculty of Law

Abstract

Schmitt was strongly opposed to the liberal approach to safeguarding the constitution, which he viewed as devoid of real political content and overly dependent on abstract legal principles. Instead, he advocated for a more decisive and politically charged role for the head of state, arguing that only such an individual could effectively protect the constitution in times of crisis. Schmitt challenged the liberal concept of a neutral and objective state, claiming that such a state is inherently incapable of making crucial political decisions necessary for safeguarding the constitution. He also criticized liberal democracy, arguing that it leads to a fragmented and indecisive political landscape, rendering it ineffective in maintaining the unity and cohesion of the state. Schmitt contended that the constitution, as the embodiment of the state's identity, cannot be protected solely through legal mechanisms but requires a strong and decisive political will—one that can act in the face of uncertainty and crisis. This article takes a descriptive-analytical approach to Karl Schmitt's critiques, a prominent German legal theorist, on liberalism, democracy, and parliamentarism, and examines their implications for the protection of the constitution.

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