Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran (Corresponding Author)
2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Carl Schmitt’s theory of political unity—centered on the conceptual distinction between Constitution and constitutional laws—offers a radical alternative for understanding the legitimacy of constitutional law and the ontological foundations of legal order in modern states. Contrary to normative approaches such as Kelsen’s Grundnorm theory, Schmitt maintains that legitimacy does not emerge from abstract norms but rather from a concrete and historical political decision through which the people recognize themselves as a unified political subject. Within this framework, the constitution is not a mere set of formal norms but the manifestation of the founding will of the people. This article analyzes Schmitt’s key work State, Movement, People, arguing that constitutional law is, in Schmitt’s view, a product of the constituent power, not its source. Through a philosophical reading of Schmitt’s triadic model—State, Movement, and People—the study explores how political unity underpins the representational structure of constitutional orders. Using a conceptual-analytical methodology, the article highlights the primacy of the constituent decision as the basis of legitimacy, offering a new theoretical lens for addressing contemporary legitimacy crises and rethinking the relationship between people and law.
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