Public Law Researsh

Abstract 1. Introduction Capital gains tax (CGT) is an important component of modern tax systems because it broadens the tax base and serves several interrelated purposes, including promoting tax justice, generating public revenue, reducing tax avoidance, encouraging productive investment, and curbing speculative transactions. It is generally imposed when a capital asset is transferred, with the taxable gain calculated as the difference between the asset’s acquisition price and its sale price. Capital assets subject to such taxation may include real estate, shares, automobiles, foreign currency, and precious metals. However, this approach can become problematic in economies experiencing persistent inflation. Inflation can increase the nominal price of an asset without increasing the owner’s real purchasing power. If tax is imposed on such nominal appreciation without an appropriate adjustment for inflation, the tax base may partly reflect monetary depreciation rather than a genuine real gain, causing the tax to function economically as a tax on wealth. The present study intended to examine why inflation should be taken into account when calculating CGT and which approach best reconciles the principles of tax justice, distributive justice, and economic efficiency across developed and underdeveloped financial markets. 2. Literature Review Systematic legal research in Iran on the direct relationship between inflation and CGT remains limited. Existing scholarship has more commonly focused on the general design of CGT, its anti-speculative function, or the adverse consequences of taxing nominal gains. International debates, meanwhile, have addressed a broader range of issues, including the lock-in effect, savings, capital formation, revenue generation, administrative complexity, distributive justice, preferential tax rates, exemptions, and indexation. The current study sought to bridge these strands of scholarship by combining a justice-based analysis of the tax base with a comparative examination of the legal techniques employed in countries with varying levels of financial-market development. 3. Materials and Methods This study employed a library research method and a descriptive–analytical approach grounded in legal–economic analysis. The analysis distinguished between nominal and real gains and evaluated the arguments for and against inflation adjustment in light of tax justice, distributive justice, and the Kaldor–Hicks criterion. Under the Kaldor–Hicks criterion, a policy is considered preferable when its broader and longer-term benefits are sufficient to outweigh its costs or, at least hypothetically, compensate those who bear them. Moreover, a comparison was made between regulatory models adopted in developed and underdeveloped financial markets. The comparative analysis examined various approaches, including preferential tax rates, partial inclusion of gains, holding-period exemptions, and direct inflation adjustment. 4. Results and Discussion Taxing nominal rather than real gains can generate several mutually reinforcing effects. Because CGT is typically triggered upon realization, taxpayers may postpone selling assets when inflationary appreciation results in a substantial tax liability. This lock-in effect can reduce market mobility and, over time, diminish tax revenue. It may also weaken incentives to save and to channel funds into banks, securities markets, housing, productive enterprises, and infrastructure. These consequences are particularly significant in underdeveloped financial markets, where reliable investment alternatives are limited and domestic savings play a greater role in financing economic development. In high-inflation economies, the additional tax burden imposed on inflationary gains may also exacerbate capital flight. Opponents of inflation adjustment argue that indexation complicates tax administration, may disproportionately benefit wealthier asset holders, and could weaken the anti-speculative function of CGT. According to the findings, however, these concerns do not justify taxing gains that do not represent a real increase in economic wealth. Advances in computational and administrative technologies have also reduced the force of the complexity objection, while the distributional implications of indexation should be assessed over a longer time horizon. From a Kaldor–Hicks perspective, inflation adjustment may provide immediate benefits to asset owners, but its longer-term effects—including stronger saving, greater capital formation, increased investment, improved voluntary compliance, and reduced capital flight—may generate broader social benefits. By contrast, taxing nominal gains may appear more progressive in the short term while imposing longer-term costs through reduced investment, employment, access to financing, and economic growth. The comparative analysis confirms that no single technique is universally applied. Developed markets often mitigate the tax burden through indirect mechanisms. The United States and Japan, for example, provide preferential treatment based on holding periods and other conditions, while Australia and Canada have adopted partial-inclusion models. Ireland has also introduced indexation following periods of high inflation, allowing tax liability to more closely reflect changes in the real value of assets. Concerning underdeveloped and emerging markets, Turkey and North Macedonia provide relief linked to longer holding periods, whereas Chile and Mexico directly adjust capital gains for inflation. India has applied indexation to certain long-term assets and has permitted taxpayers in some circumstances to choose between an indexed rate and a lower non-indexed rate. Iran’s Law on Taxation of Speculation and Speculative Transactions also recognizes the concept of inflationary gain and provides for its deduction from taxable capital gains. The comparative analysis suggests that preferential tax rates and exemptions may mitigate the effects of low inflation, but they do not reliably distinguish real gains from inflationary gains under conditions of high inflation. Direct indexation, therefore, provides a closer correspondence between the tax base and the taxpayer’s actual economic benefit. Anti-speculative objectives can instead be pursued through rules targeting short holding periods and speculative behavior, rather than by treating the erosion of monetary value caused by inflation as taxable profit. 5. Conclusion According to the present analysis, the fairness and effectiveness of CGT depend fundamentally on the accuracy of its tax base. A tax intended to promote justice and generate public revenue loses part of its normative justification when it applies to nominal appreciation that does not represent a real increase in wealth. This problem is particularly acute in high-inflation economies and underdeveloped financial markets. In such economies, taxable capital gains should therefore be calculated on a real, inflation-adjusted basis through a clear, transparent, and administratively feasible mechanism. This approach better advances tax justice and the Kaldor–Hicks conception of long-term welfare because it limits taxation to genuine economic gains while preserving incentives to save, invest, retain capital domestically, and comply voluntarily with tax obligations. The Iranian legislature’s recognition of inflationary gains is significant in principle, although its practical effectiveness depends on accurate and consistent implementation in an environment where inflation may absorb most or even all of the nominal appreciation. More broadly, anti-speculative objectives should not be pursued by taxing the erosion of monetary value as though it were genuine economic profit.

Abstract 1. Introduction The international legal architecture governing climate change has undergone significant transformation over the past three decades. Beginning with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), followed by the Kyoto Protocol and culminating in the Paris Agreement, the international climate regime has shifted from rigid, top-down mandates to a more flexible, nationally determined approach. Despite being a party to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, Iran has not ratified the Paris Agreement—placing it among a small minority of states outside the contemporary consensus on climate governance. The present study aimed to provide a legal analysis of Iran’s domestic climate-related actions in light of its international commitments, assessing the extent to which its national laws and policies align with the evolving obligations of the international climate regime. 2. Literature Review The literature on international climate law increasingly emphasizes the normative significance of the Paris Agreement’s soft-law mechanisms, particularly the principles of Highest Possible Ambition (HPA) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). In “The Power of the Paris Agreement in International Climate Litigation,” Voigt (2023) argues that, although these principles are not formally binding, they carry significant interpretive weight and increasingly inform international adjudication, as illustrated by the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) 2024 decision. Further insights can be drawn from the distinction made between conduct-based and result-based obligations, as discussed in Mayer’s contributions titled “Obligations of Conduct in the International Law on Climate Change: A Defence” (Mayer, 2018) and International Law Obligations on Climate Change Mitigation (Mayer, 2022). Moreover, in “Climate Change Mitigation and the Role of Law,” Reins and Verschuuren (2022) explored the interaction between climate policy and domestic legal frameworks. Nevertheless, the existing literature has yet to provide a focused legal critique of Iran’s climate policies within this broader trajectory of international climate governance, particularly in the post-Paris context. 3. Materials and Methods This study employed a descriptive–analytical research design grounded in two complementary qualitative methodologies: document analysis and critical discourse analysis. The document analysis was used to examine both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, as well as relevant Iranian national legislation, including the Clean Air Act (2017), the Energy Consumption Reform Act (2011), and successive national development plans. The secondary sources comprised academic literature on international and domestic climate law, reports published by non-governmental organizations, and assessments of climate policies. Moreover, critical discourse analysis was used to examine how key principles of international climate law—including due diligence, transparency, cooperation, and the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)—are articulated and reflected in Iran’s legal and policy discourse. Particular attention was given to the extent to which these principles are incorporated into Iran’s domestic climate governance and to how their interpretation and application have evolved in the context of the emerging normative framework established by the Paris Agreement. 4. Results and Discussion The evolution of the international climate regime—from the binding emission targets of the Kyoto Protocol to the procedural and participatory framework of the Paris Agreement—reflects a paradigm shift toward conduct-based obligations rooted in nationally determined efforts and good faith. Although the Paris Agreement does not impose binding emissions reductions, it nevertheless establishes a legal architecture characterized by procedural obligations concerning transparency, reporting, and progressively increasing ambition. These obligations, although often characterized as soft law, are increasingly treated as legally relevant by courts, thereby contributing to the normative force of the Agreement. Within this evolving legal framework, Iran’s position is complex. As a non-party to the Paris Agreement, Iran remains outside the core mechanisms of the global climate regime. However, at the domestic level, it has taken notable legislative and institutional steps that partially align with the objectives of the Agreement. These include mandates promoting renewable energy development, legislation on energy efficiency, and the establishment of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Organization (SATBA) to oversee implementation. In addition, Iran’s national development plans contain measurable targets, including a target of generating 5% of its electricity from renewable sources. Despite these advancements, Iran continues to face significant challenges. Persistent fossil fuel subsidies, weak enforcement, international sanctions, and limited access to finance and technology undermine the effectiveness of its energy transition policies. These deficiencies raise questions about Iran’s long-term credibility and legal exposure in the context of future international reviews and the evolving normative framework of climate law. Iran’s current trajectory suggests a willingness to engage with global climate objectives, yet its structural and geopolitical constraints continue to hinder full alignment with the international climate regime. The hybrid nature of this regime, which combines binding and non-binding norms, permits legal assessments even in relation to states that have not ratified the relevant instruments. Nevertheless, without formal ratification and comprehensive policy reform, Iran risks being perceived as non-compliant, potentially foregoing opportunities to access climate finance, strengthen capacity, and enhance international cooperation. 5. Conclusion Iran’s climate governance exhibits a dual character. While its formal exclusion from the Paris regime persists, its substantial body of domestic legislation indicates a degree of normative convergence with international climate objectives. The evolution of international climate law toward soft obligations does not absolve states of responsibility; rather, it redefines that responsibility in terms of conduct, due diligence, and transparency. For Iran, bridging the gap between domestic efforts and international expectations requires legal integration, policy coherence, and institutional capacity. Ratification of the Paris Agreement, rationalization of subsidies, and creation of transparent oversight mechanisms would significantly enhance Iran’s alignment with the evolving framework of international climate law.

Abstract 1. Introduction The advantages and efficient performance of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have led to their widespread adoption across various countries, particularly oil-rich nations. However, countries have adopted different legal approaches to the legal nature and status of these funds, giving rise to uncertainties regarding their legal implications. These uncertainties range from the jurisdiction of International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) over disputes to questions concerning judicial and enforcement immunity. In Iran, the approach adopted with respect to the legal nature of the National Development Fund of Iran (NDFI) presents not only significant ambiguities but also numerous practical challenges, particularly in the current environment of sanctions. It is thus essential to interpret the relevant regulations to determine the legal nature of the NDFI, assess its legal status under current circumstances, and ultimately develop an appropriate legal model in this regard. The present study sought to answer the following questions: What is the legal nature of sovereign wealth funds? What approaches and methodologies have been adopted internationally in this regard? What are the legal implications of this nature in international disputes? What is the legal nature and status of the National Development Fund of Iran? What are the implications thereof? And what effective strategies for legal reform can be adopted in this area? 2. Literature Review Research on SWFs in Iran remains limited and relatively sparse. There are a few attempts with a financial and economic focus, such as “Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Risk, and External Financing Costs of Financial Intermediaries” (Feghikashani & Yahyavi, 2018). Moreover, a number of studies have specifically addressed the NDFI, such as “Governance Model and Resource Allocation in the National Development Fund of Iran” (Mahmoudi et al., 2020). Published in 2024, the Persian translation of Truman’s well-known monograph titled Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation? (Truman, 2010) also deal with SWFs and their implications. Furthermore, several studies have been undertaken by public institutions in Iran. These include the report entitled An Introduction to the Currency Reserve Account and the National Development Fund (Pilehforoush, 2012) and The National Development Fund and the Outlook for Achieving New Governance in Addressing Seven Fundamental Challenges published by the NDFI in 2023. Nevertheless, the existing literature predominantly focuses on the economic and financial dimensions of SWFs and pays comparatively limited attention to their legal aspects. Accordingly, the novelty of the present research lies in its focus on examining the legal implications of SWFs in international disputes, analyzing the legal nature and status of the NDFI, and proposing potential legal reform strategies in this area. 3. Materials and Methods This study employed a descriptive–analytical approach and a library research method. It first identified and analyzed the various approaches to determining the legal nature of SWFS in the international context, drawing on reports and materials published by international organizations. It then examined the implications of the legal nature of SWFs in light of legal doctrines and ICSID arbitral practice concerning its personal jurisdiction. Particular attention was given to the implications of such legal characterization for judicial and enforcement immunity, based on records of international disputes, relevant international instruments, and the laws of various countries. Finally, the study analyzed the legal and regulatory framework governing the NDFI and identified the model adopted with respect to its legal nature. On this basis, it went on to propose corrective and reform strategies within the NDFI’s desirable legal framework. 4. Results and Discussion SWFs, regardless of their particular form, satisfy the technical and legal requirements of the international financial system and the Santiago Principles. In this respect, there is no significant distinction between SWFs that lack an independent legal personality separate from the state and those that possess such independent legal personality. Concerning the implications of the legal nature of SWFs for the personal jurisdiction of ICSID, the consolidation of the Broches criterion in ICSID arbitral practice, together with the principles embodied in the Santiago Principles, indicates a shift away from structural criteria toward an emphasis on the state’s control and managerial role, as well as the fund’s financial and legal independence from the state. Consequently, the legal nature of an SWF has become a secondary factor in determining the jurisdiction of ICSID over investment disputes brought against host states. With respect to the impact of the legal nature of SWFs on judicial and enforcement immunity, no significant distinction appears to exist between funds possessing independent legal personality and those lacking such personality. Nevertheless, in cases of uncertainty, the fund’s management structure and the extent of oversight exercised by the state may serve as secondary indicators in determining whether the fund is engaged in commercial or non-sovereign activities. It should also be noted that national legislative systems and practice of arbitral tribunals generally tend to adopt a more flexible approach when determining the criteria of statehood for the purposes of immunity. The NDFI is regarded as a pool of state-owned assets and does not possess an independent legal personality. To establish an optimal legal model for SWFs under the Iranian law, it is first necessary to recognize and clearly define the NDFI’s independent legal personality and the specific legal implications arising from such status. Furthermore, given the increasing number of SWFs, the necessary legal and executive powers should be provided to establish appropriate legal frameworks for private investment based on a non-sovereign model. Priority should also be given to portfolio investments. 5. Conclusion There are deficiencies and ambiguities surrounding the Broches criterion, particularly with regard to the concept of representation and its interpretation in a manner that is inconsistent with the prevailing understanding of the term across various legal systems and under international law. It is thus necessary to develop an effective interpretation of this concept and to clearly delineate its scope and dimensions. In determining whether judicial and enforcement immunity, as well as other limitations and privileges accorded to states in the context of foreign investment and international trade, apply to SWFs, the general principle should be that—where reasonable efforts by arbitral tribunals or the relevant authorities of the host state fail to establish the legal nature of the fund with sufficient certainty—its subject and actions, and consequently the assets associated with them, should not be presumed to be sovereign in nature. The development of an effective strategy concerning the legal nature and regulatory framework of SWFs under the Iranian law currently requires legislative reform. In this regard, it is recommended that Article 16 of the Law on Permanent Provisions of National Development Plans be amended to recognize the independent legal personality of the NDFI and the specific legal implications arising from such status, particularly its independence with respect to assets and management. Such reform should also provide a legal basis for establishing other national investment entities and for creating a chain of investment companies in which private shareholders hold controlling interests, ultimately allowing foreign individuals and entities to participate in such companies. Furthermore, with respect to surplus revenues derived from oil and other natural resources, and taking into account monetary and fiscal policies as well as national development priorities and budgetary considerations, additional national investment entities should be established pursuant to a unified legislative framework or dedicated enabling legislation.

Abstract 1. Introduction Law, in its true sense, is a manifestation of the public will and a safeguard of citizens’ rights and freedoms against arbitrary actions by the state and public officials. The judicial system serves as a forum for resolving disputes between citizens and the state; however, under authoritarian regimes, it may become an instrument for suppressing citizens’ rights and freedoms. The independence of attorneys within the judiciary is one of the fundamental guarantees of the rule of law. It also facilitates oversight by a specialized and professional civil society of the conduct of judges and public officials, contributing to the effective functioning of the judicial system in protecting and realizing citizens’ rights and freedoms. In this respect, the present study aimed to examine the independence of attorneys within the judiciary, its impact on the rule of law, and its status within the Iranian judicial system. 2. Literature Review A review of Persian-language books and articles suggests that there is no significant research on the independence of attorneys within the judiciary and its relationship to the rule of law in the Iranian judicial system. 3. Materials and Methods The present study used a descriptive–analytical method and library-based sources to examine the independence of attorneys within the judiciary and its relationship to the rule of law in the Iranian judicial system. 4. Results and Discussion In the Iranian judicial system, the independence of attorneys is not guaranteed, and lawyers cannot perform their professional duties independently. According to the Note to Article 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, only lawyers approved by the Head of the Judiciary may represent litigants in certain proceedings. The requirement for such approval fundamentally undermines the independence of lawyers, while those who receive approval remain at risk of having it revoked at any time. Furthermore, the establishment of the Center for Judiciary Lawyers under Article 187 of the Third Development Plan has fundamentally undermined the independence of the legal profession. The possibility of denying access to a judicial file under Article 191 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—based on the investigating authority’s determination and in the absence of a specific legal criterion for the necessity of discovering the truth—further restricts the lawyer’s role. Similarly, the possibility of expelling a lawyer from a hearing under Article 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—in the absence of a clear legal criterion for observing court order—creates another significant limitation. In addition, the absence of in-person advocacy by litigants’ lawyers in cases brought before the Supreme Court on appeal, as well as the lack of participation of independent lawyers in the drafting and consideration of opinions presented to the General Assembly of the Supreme Court, has further weakened the role of independent lawyers in the three realms of the rule of law. 5. Conclusion The independence of attorneys within the judiciary prevents the instrumentalization of the judicial system by powerful individuals and institutions, protects the rule of law against the arbitrary exercise of judicial power, and ensures a fair environment for litigation and trial. When bringing legal actions against the state or powerful public officials, citizens are often hesitant or fearful of initiating proceedings. The deterrent effect of legal rules depends largely on their effective enforcement. Powerful officials are more likely to comply with the law when they know that they may be held legally accountable and prosecuted at any time for violations of legal rules. Undoubtedly, in order to preserve their social legitimacy and prestige, states generally maintain the appearance of lawful social control and avoid openly suppressing human rights and civil liberties. For this reason, however, they may use legal and judicial mechanisms as instruments of domination and repression. In such circumstances, the rule of law is replaced by the rule by law, whereby law and the judicial system become instruments for establishing and maintaining political authority. The independence of attorneys within the judiciary helps prevent the judicial system from being used to suppress civil rights and liberties under the influence of powerful political, security, religious, or other individuals and institutions. It also limits the use of prosecution and punishment as instruments of political domination and of state power.

Abstract 1. Introduction China’s re-emergence as a global power, together with the far-reaching transformations of recent decades, has significantly enhanced its importance in international affairs. Its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, expanding presence in West Asia, and increasingly consequential relations with Iran make China a subject requiring systematic attention across a range of fields. China, one of the world’s oldest civilizations, is the second most populous country and accounts for nearly one-fifth of the global population. It is also the fourth-largest country in the world by land area. For more than eighteen of the past twenty centuries, China has occupied a prominent position in global gross domestic product (GDP) relative to other nations. It is also noteworthy that various predictions made at the turn of the second and third millennia anticipated a decline in China’s legal and political system within a fifteen-year period. These predictions, however, did not materialize. Instead, China’s relatively sustained economic growth has led some scholars to argue that the country is on a trajectory toward becoming the world’s leading economic power. Today, China accounts for nearly one-fifth of global GDP and is the primary trading partner of numerous countries around the world, including almost all states in the Middle East. Taken together, these factors underscore the need for all countries, including Iran, to pay close attention to China and to develop and manage their relations with it with clarity and strategic foresight. Against this background, the legal study of China is significant for at least two reasons. First, China has exerted considerable influence on the development and evolution of international law and, consequently, affects all international legal actors, including Iran. Second, understanding the Chinese conception of law is essential for structuring bilateral and multilateral relations within appropriate legal frameworks and in a manner consistent with national interests. Moreover, China has increasingly transitioned from a rule-taking actor to a rule-making one in international law. This shift is reflected in, inter alia, its increased exercise of veto power, its role in establishing new international institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and its promotion of approaches to dispute settlement informed by Eastern legal traditions—in contrast to conventional methods that predominate in various areas of international law. In this respect, the present study sough to address the following questions: What legal traditions underlie the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China? How do these traditions shape the interpretive frameworks of the two constitutional texts, particularly with respect to the distribution of power, legislative logic, and institutional accountability? And what implications do these differences have for understanding institutional behavior and designing legal interactions between Iran and China? 2. Literature Review Existing literature on the constitutional systems of Iran and China has generally examined the two legal orders independently. Scholarship on Iran typically analyzes the Constitution within the framework of Islamic legal traditions and theories of religious governance, whereas studies of China tend to focus on the role of the Communist Party, East Asian intellectual traditions, and the Chinese conception of the rule of law. However, a review of the existing literature reveals a lack of comprehensive, systematic, and direct comparative research examining the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China side by side. In particular, the constitutional texts and structures of the two systems, the logic underlying the distribution of political power, and the mechanisms and models of institutional accountability have not been systematically compared. Moreover, previous studies have not examined the legal traditions that have shaped both constitutional orders within a unified analytical framework. Consequently, the existing literature lacks both a comprehensive comparative constitutional analysis of Iran and China and a tradition-based approach that interprets both constitutions in light of their respective legal and intellectual heritages. The present study sought to address this gap by developing a comparative analysis grounded in these foundational legal traditions. 3. Materials and Methods This study used a comparative legal research methodology to examine and compare the constitutional systems of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China. The comparative approach focused on the analysis of similarities and differences in legal–political systems in relation to the constitutional texts and traditions. 4. Results and Discussion China’s Constitution is shaped by both Neo-Confucian and Romano–Germanic legal traditions, whereas Iran’s Constitution is influenced by Islamic and Romano–Germanic legal traditions. The similarities between the two constitutional systems primarily stem from their shared roots in the Romano–Germanic legal tradition, while their differences can largely be attributed to the distinct Neo-Confucian and Islamic legal traditions that inform each system. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran reflects elements of the Romano–Germanic legal tradition while being more fundamentally grounded in the principles of Islamic law and adherence to Islamic norms. In a similar fashion, the Chinese Constitution incorporates elements of the Romano–Germanic legal tradition—particularly in its treatment of individual liberties and its integration of socialist doctrines—while also being significantly

shaped by the Neo-Confucian legal tradition and its core principles, including harmony and service. This influence is particularly evident in the role of the National People’s Congress (NPC), which functions as the central coordinating authority within the state structure, with other state organs positioned beneath it and accountable to it. Members of the Congress are likewise expected to serve society and act as exemplary figures. 5. Conclusion It may thus be concluded that treating the constitution as the foundational text of the legal–political order makes it possible to identify the overarching rules governing the distribution of authority, the logic of legislation, and models of accountability, thereby rendering institutional behavior more intelligible. From this perspective, a comparison of the Chinese and Iranian constitutions revealed two distinct layers: (1) a shared layer influenced by the Romano–Germanic legal tradition, particularly with respect to certain individual liberties and legislative mechanisms; and (2) a distinctive layer rooted in the respective Neo-Confucian and Islamic legal traditions. This distinction is reflected in differing approaches to governance, including an emphasis on harmony and vertical accountability as opposed to horizontal separation and independence of powers; in models of economic regulation, particularly the coexistence of state and market mechanisms oriented toward collective benefit; and in approaches to dispute resolution, where dialogue and mediation are generally preferred to adversarial procedures. On this basis, several practical implications can be identified for Iran, including enhancing the precision and effectiveness of cross-border legal decision-making, improving the assessment of institutional risks, strengthening the design of legal instruments and dispute-resolution mechanisms, and avoiding hasty analogies or unwarranted transfers of concepts between the two legal systems.

Abstract 1. Introduction The constitution is one of the most complex concepts in the field of law. A vast body of literature has developed around the history of the concept, its nature and philosophy, its functions and content, and the ways in which constitutions are designed. One important issue in this regard concerns the different types of constitutions. Among these is the authoritarian constitution. With the emergence of constitutionalism and the idea of limiting state power, it became difficult to imagine that a constitution could serve to consolidate the power of authoritarian rulers. Historical experience, however, has demonstrated that authoritarian regimes also have constitutions and often insist on maintaining such a document. As fundamental instruments of governance, constitutions express a state’s political identity, institutional architecture, and underlying values. They also establish the structural distribution of power and define relationships both among state institutions and between the state and its citizens. The principal aim of constitutionalism is to regulate the exercise of state power through the rule of law and to constrain governmental action. Liberal constitutionalism, in particular, is associated with the separation of powers, democratic elections, and legally enforceable rights. The concept of constitutionalism is so closely intertwined with liberalism that it may be argued that, in the absence of liberal principles, a constitution may struggle to fulfill its fundamental purposes. Because constitutionalism is commonly understood as an antidote to tyranny, some scholars argue that the term constitutionalism appears paradoxical in illiberal states. This, however, does not mean that a constitution cannot be illiberal or authoritarian. In this respect, the present study sought to examine the concept and function of the authoritarian constitution. 2. Literature Review Following successive waves of democratization, some scholars have argued that constitutionalism itself is undergoing a process of erosion. Others contend that contemporary developments represent the self-destruction of liberal democracy through democratic procedures operating under the formal framework of the rule of law. More than half of the world’s countries remain far removed from the model of constitutional democracy. Many are governed by authoritarian regimes, while others are subject to forms of rule that may be characterized as openly tyrannical. This reality has attracted scholarly attention to the apparent tension between the traditional understanding of constitutions as instruments for limiting state power and their continued existence in systems primarily oriented toward preserving and consolidating such power. The literature therefore raises the question of how constitutions function within authoritarian systems and why constitutions persist despite their potential to constrain state authority 3. Materials and Methods The present study used a descriptive–analytical method, drawing on the most significant scholarship in the field as well as the constitutional experiences of various countries. 4. Results and Discussion Why authoritarian states that do not want their power to be limited nevertheless move towards adopting constitutions is an important point of analysis and discussion. The first reason why authoritarian regimes adopt constitutions is that all regimes need to coordinate the roles and responsibilities of different institutions within the government. A written constitution can minimize conflicts among the primary institutions of any regime. All regimes require mechanisms of control, and a constitution can provide such mechanisms. In authoritarian constitutions, there is often a gap between the promises made in the constitutional text and sociopolitical reality. Moreover, in these countries, there is usually an institution or authority beyond the constitution that holds the real power in the country, creating a significant gap between the constitutional text and the way it is implemented in practice. This gap is generally greater in authoritarian states than in democratic states. Authoritarian regimes are less likely to uphold the rights enshrined in their constitutions and tend to promise to protect and implement such rights for the sake of appearance rather than out of genuine commitment. Authoritarian regimes and their constitutions can be divided into three types: monarchical, military, and civilian. Authoritarian regimes are rational actors that choose the type of constitution they adopt by balancing the costs and benefits associated with each option. A detailed and descriptive constitution may help an authoritarian regime overcome problems of internal coordination, but it can also expose the regime to delegitimizing criticism from domestic and international audiences. Authoritarian states are more likely than democratic states to adopt fictitious constitutions that contain a set of basic rights that are not observed in practice. Monarchies and military regimes are more likely than civilian regimes to follow this strategy. Of the three types, civilian regimes have historically been the most common, while monarchies have been the least common. Each type of authoritarian regime is characterized by a distinct power base and a particular structure for resolving internal conflicts, controlling actors outside the regime, and coordinating political actions. 5. Conclusion Approximately, one-third of the world’s population has never experienced constitutional democracy within open and free societies. Moreover, populist and authoritarian tendencies have contributed to the erosion and, in some cases, the collapse of democratic systems. Global experience demonstrates that constitutions may also serve anti-democratic purposes rather than merely limiting state power. Against this background, the current analysis examined the concept and function of the authoritarian constitution by drawing on the constitutional experiences of various authoritarian countries. Constitutions in authoritarian countries often exhibit several distinctive characteristics, including the existence of quasi-constitutional arrangements, the establishment of institutions that exist primarily on paper, the limited protection of fundamental rights, and the maintenance of a formal appearance of democratic governance. These features demonstrate that constitutions in authoritarian systems may perform functions that differ significantly from those traditionally associated with constitutionalism and the limitation of state power.

Abstract 1. Introduction It is certainly desirable to incorporate autonomy into weapons systems and battlefield decision-making processes, as this can enhance precision and reliability without sacrificing the robustness and flexibility of human intelligence. However, the use of autonomous weapons in armed conflict raises specific legal challenges, particularly with regard to attributing criminal liability for unlawful targeting. It is therefore important not only to establish a basis for attributing liability in connection with autonomous weapon systems, but also to determine appropriate mechanisms for compensating damage caused by their use. Since their emergence, military AI-enabled technologies have challenged conventional conceptions of criminal liability and raised complex questions concerning legal frameworks for providing compensation for harm. There are numerous challenges in determining liability for serious crimes and violations of international humanitarian law committed through the use of autonomous weapons. Although the management of military operations remains primarily a human task, autonomous systems operate on the basis of target signatures and parameters previously established by programmers, which enable them to search for, identify, track, and prioritize targets. If this mode of operation results in the killing of civilians or the destruction of civilian objects, complex questions of criminal law arise. These include questions concerning the foreseeability of the autonomous system’s operation under human supervision—the so-called the problem of many hands—and whether there is a sufficient basis for attributing criminal liability at an appropriate level. To determine the issues of criminal liability arising in cases where weapons systems unlawfully use lethal force, it is necessary to consider the framework established by the four Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions require states to adopt criminal measures to punish persons who commit, or order the commission of, grave breaches of the Conventions. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions constitute war crimes, with violations of the principle of distinction providing a particularly clear example. An autonomous weapon system may target a civilian or a combatant outside the battlefield for a variety of reasons. Such systems may misinterpret the circumstances in which they operate or behave in ways that their programmers did not anticipate. The present study aimed to examine how international criminal law responds to the challenges posed by the use of autonomous weapon systems, with particular emphasis on the criminal liability of those involved in the commission of international crimes involving such weapons. The development of any modern weapon is a complex process involving multiple teams, individuals and organizations at every stage, from the initial conceptualization and design through development, production, and ultimately deployment. A sophisticated autonomous weapon system is therefore rarely developed by a single individual. Rather, it is the product of numerous actors and groups working on different subsystems that may have complex interdependencies. In such circumstances, attributing individual responsibility for a violation—whether intentional or accidental—and identifying the person or persons responsible for the subsequent conduct of a weapons system that results in the commission of an international crime may be particularly difficult in attempting to initiate criminal proceedings. Against this backdrop, this study sough to examine whether the existing framework of international criminal law is capable of adequately addressing the challenges arising from crimes committed through the use of autonomous weapons. Given the involvement of numerous actors in the design, development, programming, training, production, and deployment of these systems, the central question is: Who bears criminal liability for international crimes committed through the use of military AI? 2. Literature Review It seems there is a lack of Persian-language scholarship examining approaches to international criminal liability arising from the use of AI-enabled weapons systems in the commission of international crimes. Leave aside general discussions on autonomous weapon systems in Iran, it seems there is no Persian-language research that directly and specifically addresses the subject. At the international level, given the growing importance of military AI and AI-enabled weapon systems, prominent scholars have produced significant scholarship on AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Although some of these publications touch upon questions of international criminal liability arising from the deployment of such weapons in armed conflict, it seems there is no study that comprehensively examines the specific subject matter addressed in the current inquiry. Moreover, the existing scholarship tends to address international criminal liability for autonomous weapons in the military domain in a fragmented and inconsistent manner. No research seems to have systematically engaged with the central hypothesis of this research, either by articulating and substantiating it or by challenging and refuting it with a comparable degree of coherence and methodological rigor. 3. Materials and Methods This study employed a descriptive–analytical research methodology. It used a library research protocol to collect the data from relevant scholarly and legal sources. 4. Results and Discussion Although the benefits of AI for humanity are undeniable, the concerns surrounding criminal liability for crimes committed through the use of military AI cannot be readily disregarded. Autonomous weapon systems require states and legal scholars to reconsider existing legal doctrines and approaches to attribution. States should therefore recognize AI-enabled systems as having a degree of legal (electronic) personality. At the same time, holding AI-enabled systems themselves criminally liable or imposing criminal penalties on them is incompatible with fundamental principles of criminal law and does not appear legally or conceptually coherent. Rather, human moral agents must remain accountable for the conduct of these systems. However, because multiple individuals and groups may be involved in the design, development, production, programming, deployment, operation, or command of military AI, identifying and holding a specific individual criminally responsible may be difficult, if not impossible, under existing legal frameworks. Accordingly, manufacturers, operators, commanders, programmers, corporate leaders, and senior defence officials should be subject to appropriate forms of accountability where they exercise relevant authority or effective control over autonomous weapon systems and where their conduct contributes to the commission of international crimes through the use of such systems. According to the findings, none of the existing or proposed concepts provides an adequate and comprehensive solution. For this reason, the development of autonomous weapons should be stopped. However, this solution is unlikely to be achieved, as no state wants to lose the arms race or fall behind in the development of a powerful military, which could result from abandoning autonomous weapons. Such a development is even more unrealistic given the contemporary geopolitical situation in certain parts of the world, including Taiwan, Kosovo, Syria, Karabakh, and Palestine. Therefore, greater efforts should be made to develop an appropriate framework for determining the responsibilities of those involved in the development and use of autonomous weapons. One possible alternative is to ban or restrict the production and use of AI-enabled autonomous weapons within the framework of international humanitarian law. Strict liability is also one possible legal framework for establishing accountability for AI-related harms. Although there has so far been considerable resistance to this form of liability in international jurisprudence—particularly because of the requirement to establish a specific state of mind or degree of fault—the acceptance of strict liability would not only eliminate legal uncertainty but also resolve many of the problems associated with identifying the human actors behind autonomous agents and holding them accountable. Moreover, liability extends far beyond individual criminal liability. State liability for the deployment of autonomous weapon systems that result in serious violations of the laws of armed conflict is also significant. States acquiring new weapon systems or modifying existing ones should consider imposing product liability requirements on developers, manufacturers, and sellers of such systems to help cover the costs of compensation in the event of a breach of international legal obligations. Finally, multilateral cooperation among states is necessary to ensure that AI-enabled weapons are equipped with black boxes that can assist the International Criminal Court or other international tribunals in determining their role in the commission of international crimes. These black boxes should contain a record of the individuals involved in the production, design, programming, planning, and operation of the systems, as well as relevant information concerning their respective roles. 5. Conclusion Although attributing direct criminal liability to a specific individual in this context is complex, an interpretive application of Articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute, together with the doctrine of hierarchical responsibility, can provide a basis for attributing liability to individuals or groups of individuals who play a decisive role in the design, development, deployment, or command of AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Accordingly, human actors who occupy a position within the chain of supervision or command and exercise effective control over others may be held liable.

Abstract 1. Introduction With the proliferation of laws and the decline in legislative quality, states have increasingly come to view legislation not merely as a tool for regulating society, but also as a matter requiring careful consideration and caution. This shift in perspective has contributed to the emergence of the concept of good legislation. The legal mandate requiring Islamic hijab has been part of state policy since the early years of the Islamic Revolution and has subsequently been formalized through parliamentary legislation. Nevertheless, hijab remains a subject of ongoing debate, as it constitutes a contested norm shaped by the long-standing tension between tradition and modernity. This research aimed to examine the relationship between the principles of good legislation and the legal mandate of Islamic hijab. The study sought to answer the following research questions: Which principles of good legislation are relevant to the legal mandate of Islamic hijab? And how is the quality of legislation concerning the legal mandate of Islamic hijab? 2. Literature Review There is extensive literature on topics of good legislation and the principles and techniques of legislation. In this respect, a significant contribution is the Persian-language report titled Good Legislation: Foundations, Indicators, and Dimensions (Vakilian, 2023). Other relevant works include Principles and Techniques of Legislation (Ansari, 2020) and a book with the same title by Eslami (2022). In addition, Theoretical Foundations of Reforming the Legislative System (Rasekh, 2005) is another contribution concerning the different aspects of legislation. There is also significant research literature on hijab and its legal mandate. However, most existing studies have approached hijab primarily from a jurisprudential perspective, and no study has examined hijab through the lens of good legislation. 3. Materials and Methods The present study employed a descriptive–analytical methodology coupled with conceptual analysis. It also drew on library research and online sources for data collection. 4. Results and Discussion The legal mandate of Islamic hijab disregards the normative conflicts within society, thereby undermining the very foundation of law, which is rooted in managing societal contradictions and regulating conflicting ideals. There is significant doubt regarding the effectiveness of these laws, as their presence in the legal system imposes substantial bureaucratic, institutional, and executive costs. At the same time, they risk becoming either incomplete or abandoned. The relevant bill (known as Hijab and Chastity Bill)—which was intended to serve as a future legislative framework—was rejected by the Guardian Council five times and was subsequently suspended by the Supreme National Security Council. Such instances further highlight the poor quality of the bill and its numerous shortcomings from both religious and legal perspectives. Although hijab, in its customary sense, has traditionally been regarded as a social value in Iran, its perception as such has diminished under the influence of globalization. Observance of Islamic hijab has declined steadily in recent years, to the extent that an estimated 60 to 70 percent of Iranian society does not fully adhere to it. This is despite the fact that, since the Islamic Revolution, numerous resolutions have been adopted concerning the legal mandate of Islamic hijab, and multiple institutions have been involved in its enforcement. In light of this evidence, there are strong grounds for questioning the effectiveness of these laws. Nevertheless, the legislature continues to pursue the same approach, advancing the Hijab and Chastity Bill and allocating public funds to a legislative initiative whose effectiveness remains highly questionable. The language used in the legal mandate of hijab, particularly in the Hijab and Chastity Bill, is also subject to criticism on the grounds of ambiguity. Such vague language undermines the bill’s legal certainty and compromises citizens’ legal security, both of which are fundamental principles of good legislation. From the perspective of legality and adherence to the rule of law, the actions of relevant institutions are likewise open to scrutiny. The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution has acted in a legislative capacity—in direct contradiction to Article 58 of the Constitution—while executive bodies such as the police have, at times, taken measures that violate the law. Furthermore, judicial authorities have issued rulings based on arbitrary interpretations. Statistics indicate that a significant part of society does not fully observe the Islamic hijab. Under such circumstances, continued legislation on this matter is likely to result in widespread non-compliance with the law, effectively criminalizing a substantial segment of the population. By adopting an authoritarian approach to the balance between freedom and power, the state has exceeded the proper limits of its authority while disregarding fundamental freedoms. A more appropriate approach would be to adopt a neutral stance toward hijab. Removing the legal mandate requiring Islamic hijab does not, in itself, conflict with the Islamic character of the state. 5. Conclusion The analysis focused on the extent to which the legal mandate of Islamic hijab conforms to the principles of good legislation, evaluating the quality of the relevant legislation. A thorough understanding and application of the principles of good legislation are essential for legislators to avoid enacting laws that fail to account for the prudential nature of legislation. This, in turn, can help prevent the adoption of unenforceable statutes and the resulting waste of public resources. In the context of legislation mandating the Islamic hijab, the concept of good legislation—in addition to principles such as legality, certainty, and effectiveness—requires deeper reflection on the inherent nature of law, which often emerges from the management of social conflicts arising from divergent norms and ideals. Accordingly, the current inquiry sought to introduce a novel analytical framework for understanding hijab as a contested norm deeply embedded in the historical fabric of Iranian society. Previous scholarly works have not specifically examined the legal mandate of Islamic hijab from the perspective of good legislation. Moreover, the conceptualization of hijab as a contested norm remains unexplored in the relevant academic literature. The novel contribution of this research lies in the wide range of philosophical and historical concepts it engages with. This study is therefore the culmination of the sustained intellectual engagement with such intricate issues. These continuing intellectual concerns are primarily prompted by the relatively recent emergence of legisprudence as a distinct field of inquiry and the broad range of concepts associated with it.

Abstract 1. Introduction The increasing complexity of multinational operations in the modern era has brought critical questions concerning state responsibility for joint conduct under international law to the forefront. The present study aimed to undertake a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks governing concurrent responsibility, juxtaposing the principles set out in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The study sought to answer the following questions: (1) How does the ECtHR reconcile the ILC’s principle of concurrent responsibility for joint conduct with the jurisdictional limitations imposed by Article 1 of the ECHR? (2) What implications does this reconciliation—or the absence thereof—have for accountability in multinational operations, particularly in contexts such as military coalitions and shared governance arrangements? And (3) can a coherent doctrine be developed to reconcile the ILC’s universalist approach to concurrent responsibility with the ECtHR’s predominantly territorially anchored jurisprudence? The analysis focused on the tension between the ILC’s recognition of concurrent responsibility for joint conduct and the ECtHR’s jurisdictional thresholds under Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which generally requires a sufficient basis for attributing conduct to a state within its jurisdiction, including through the exercise of effective control over individuals or territory 2. Literature Review Existing scholarship reveals significant divergences in approaches to state responsibility. Although the ILC’s Articles on ARSIWA are not legally binding as such, they largely codify and reflect customary international law. Article 47, in particular, recognizes the possibility of concurrent responsibility where multiple states participate in a joint organ or collective action resulting in an internationally wrongful act. The framework also addresses attribution through effective control (Article 8), but does not provide a mechanism for apportioning liability among multiple responsible states. In contrast, the ECtHR’s case law, as seen in Hussein v. Albania (2006) and Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom (2011), prioritizes territorial jurisdiction and direct operational control, requiring claimants to prove a state’s specific role in alleged violations. Critics like Larsen, in “Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test” (2008), and Talmon, in “The Procedural Obligation Under Article 2 ECHR to Investigate and Cooperate with Investigations of Unlawful Killings in a Cross-Border Context” (2019), argue that the ECtHR’s rigid jurisdictional thresholds can create accountability gaps, especially in opaque multinational operations. Recent scholarship—such as Samantha Besson’s “Concurrent Responsibilities Under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2018) and Ryngaert’s “Extraterritorial Obligations Under Human Rights Law” (2018)—further explore the interplay between human rights law and state sovereignty. 3. Materials and Methods This study employed a comparative legal analysis, combining a textual examination of the ILC’s Articles on ARSIWA with an analysis of key ECtHR’s judgments. Moreover, a critical assessment of scholarly critiques and doctrinal debates informed the identification and synthesis of emerging trends across both legal frameworks. The case studies were situated within broader themes of accountability, jurisdiction, and the evolving nature of multinational cooperation. The methodology helped bridge the theoretical analysis of state responsibility with practical insights derived from judicial reasoning, highlighting the dynamic interaction between international legal norms and regional human rights regimes. 4. Results and Discussion The ECtHR’s reliance on effective control as a jurisdictional prerequisite under Article 1 of the ECHR imposes a higher evidentiary burden than the ILC’s model of concurrent responsibility. In Hussein v. Albania, the ECtHR rejected claims against 21 coalition states concerning detainee abuses in Iraq, citing insufficient evidence of direct control. Similarly, in Hess v. the United Kingdom (1975), the Court dismissed claims of responsibility arising from shared governance in post-war Berlin, treating jurisdiction as indivisible. However, the post-Al-Skeini jurisprudence reflects a shift towards a more functional conception of jurisdiction. In Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom (2011), the ECtHR recognized the United Kingdom’s responsibility for deaths in Basra during the occupation, linking the exercise of jurisdiction to the performance of public powers even in the absence of formal territorial control. This sliding scale approach accommodates the allocation of obligations according to the degree of operational authority exercised, a principle subsequently affirmed in Jaloud v. the Netherlands (2014), where Dutch operational command over a checkpoint was sufficient to establish liability. Despite these developments, the ECtHR’s emphasis on individualized responsibility risks perpetuating accountability gaps. For example, in WS v. Frontex (2023), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed claims against the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency on the basis of an insufficient direct causal link, highlighting the difficulties of attributing responsibility in decentralized and multinational operations. By contrast, the ILC’s framework, as illustrated by cases such as Mothers of Srebrenica v. the Netherlands (2019), provides greater flexibility by allowing responsibility to be attributed on the basis of shared effective control, even in complex multilateral contexts. The ECtHR’s jurisprudence reflects a form of jurisdictional realism that prioritizes legal certainty over collective accountability. Although the cases of Al-Skeini and Jaloud represent significant developments in recognizing functional forms of control, the Court’s emphasis on direct causation and role-specific evidence may nevertheless limit accountability within opaque multinational frameworks. This stands in marked contrast to the ILC’s approach, which allows shared participation to give rise to concurrent responsibility. For example, the ECtHR’s rejection of responsibility in Hess v. the United Kingdom—despite the United Kingdom’s veto power over detainee conditions—illustrates the Court’s reluctance to engage with forms of indirect influence or systemic negligence. The tension between these frameworks reflects broader debates within international law concerning whether accountability should be grounded primarily in territorial sovereignty or should instead accommodate the realities of collective governance. The ECtHR’s approach protects the autonomy of states but may also risk facilitating accountability avoidance within coalitions. Conversely, the ILC’s framework remains largely aspirational and lacks independent enforcement mechanisms. Scholarly proposals, including Besson’s concept of modular obligations and Larsen’s advocacy of positive duties in shared operations, seek to bridge this divide by developing intermediate approaches. Such approaches would hold states responsible for foreseeable harms that they had the capacity to prevent or mitigate through diplomatic, operational, or institutional means. 5. Conclusion This analysis identified a doctrinal divide between the ILC’s universalist approach to accountability and the ECtHR’s jurisdictional pragmatism. Three reforms are proposed to bridge this gap. The first concerns the expansion of positive obligations. The states participating in joint operations should bear responsibility for using their influence and available means to prevent foreseeable human rights violations, even in the absence of direct control. The second involves the adoption of functional attribution standards. The ECtHR could incorporate the ILC’s effective control criterion under Article 8 of the ARSIWA into its jurisprudence, drawing on approaches reflected in the case of Mothers of Srebrenica to better address situations involving shared governance and responsibility. The third reform is to shift the evidentiary burden. In cases involving systemic violations, states should be required, where appropriate, to demonstrate that they lacked a meaningful role in the alleged collective harm, thereby reducing the evidentiary burden on claimants operating in opaque multinational contexts. A harmonized doctrine should balance the ECtHR’s emphasis on jurisdictional clarity with the ILC’s broader conception of collective accountability, ensuring that states cannot exploit institutional ambiguities to evade accountability. By reconciling these paradigms, international law can better address the complexities of twenty-first-century multinational cooperation while upholding universal human rights.