Public Law
seyedeh zahra saeid
Abstract
The explanation of political systems in the context of the concepts of a unified government and a divided government gives a clear information of the relationship between the ruling powers. According to the mentioned concepts, the research with its analytical-critical method aims to explain the type ...
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The explanation of political systems in the context of the concepts of a unified government and a divided government gives a clear information of the relationship between the ruling powers. According to the mentioned concepts, the research with its analytical-critical method aims to explain the type of relations between government and parliament as well as within the executive branch. The purpose of above reviews is to reject the claim of semi-presidentialism of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In the 1358 Constitution, in opinion and not necessarily in practice, the relationship between the government and the parliament was in accordance with unified government. In addition, we were facing a divided government at the level of the executive branch. According to the amendment of the constitution and the removal of the prime minister as the guarantor of unified government and holding separate presidential and parliamentary elections, the relationship between these two institutions can be examined in the form of a divided government. Due to the exclusive, joint and overlapping executive powers between the leadership and the president as stipulated in the constitution, creation of divided government at the level of the executive branch as well, is worth thinking.
Public Law
Seyedeh Zahra Saeid
Abstract
IntroductionIn most political systems, parliaments or legislative assemblies play a crucial role in government formation. Oftentimes, the agreement or disagreement within the legislative assembly can determine the success or failure of government formation. Disagreements may either result in the failure ...
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IntroductionIn most political systems, parliaments or legislative assemblies play a crucial role in government formation. Oftentimes, the agreement or disagreement within the legislative assembly can determine the success or failure of government formation. Disagreements may either result in the failure to form a government or simply delay its formation. In the former scenario, parliamentary supremacy dictates that disagreement within the parliament may necessitate a re-election. In the latter scenario, while the government maintains authority given its legal status, it may have to compromise on its preferences to avoid the delayed government formation. The investiture vote or vote of confidence, as a legal institution, typically characterizes the first situation in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, whereas the appointment confirmation process mirrors the second scenario in presidential systems.Articles (87) and (133) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) address the investiture vote or vote of confidence. As stipulated in Article (87), “The President must obtain, for the Council of Ministers, after being formed and before all other business, a vote of confidence from the Assembly.” According to Article (133),Ministers will be appointed by the President and will be presented to the Assembly for a vote of confidence. With the change of Assembly, a new vote of confidence will not be necessary. The number of Ministers and the jurisdiction of each will be determined by law.These articles mandate that the government must obtain an investiture vote from the Islamic Consultative Assembly. At first glance, it may appear that the investiture vote outlined in the Constitution seems to be similar to the specific institution of investiture vote in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. However, a comparative analysis reveals nuanced differences. In this respect, the present research aimed to address the following research questions: What legal role does the Islamic Consultative Assembly play in government formation as stated in the Constitution? In other words, does the concept of investiture vote in the Constitution of the IRI align with its specialized usage in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems? The study is based on the hypothesis that there are some distinctions between the investiture vote in the Constitution of the IRI and its counterparts in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Literature ReviewA brief analysis of the nature of the investiture vote can be found in a recent article titled “The Parliamentary or Presidential Nature of the Vote of Confidence to the Council of Ministers in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Taghizadeh & Taghizadeh-Chari, 2022). The present study not only confirmed the conclusions of the aforementioned article but also delved into the nature of the investiture vote outlined in the Constitution in more details by identifying the components inherent in the investiture vote and the appointment confirmation process. Materials and MethodsThe present study employed a critical–analytical approach to examine the nature of investiture vote in the Constitution of the IRI and the distinctions between the investiture vote in Iran and analogous processes in other political systems. Results and DiscussionThe findings of the study revealed three important points. First, in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, the investiture vote typically concerns three categories: the entire composition of the cabinet, the head of government, or the government’s program. Different countries based on parliamentary and semi-presidential systems may adopt varying formats of investiture vote, accepting one category or all the three in their legal systems. However, the appointment confirmation process is conducted on an individual basis, focusing on each cabinet member separately. While the Constitution of the IRI refers to the entire composition of the cabinet for the investiture vote, practical challenges necessitate an individual format, thus aligning it more closely with the appointment confirmation process. Second, in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, it is necessary that the government be aligned with the parliamentary majority. Consequently, in case of changes in members of parliament, the government must seek a new investiture vote. This reflects the political context of the investiture vote as a legal institution. In the appointment confirmation process, however, the government’s political alignment with the legislative majority is not obligatory. Instead, the qualification of cabinet members in such systems is primarily based on their competence, resumes, and experiences. Article (133) of the Constitution of the IRI states that the government is not obliged to seek an investiture vote in the event of changes of Assembly. This stipulation, along with the procedure undertaken by members of parliament to scrutinize the qualifications of cabinet members, points towards a non-political context surrounding the investiture vote and its similarity to the appointment confirmation process.Third, in parliamentary systems, the failure to obtain an investiture vote prevents the formation of government. In some countries, successive failures in securing the investiture vote may lead to the dissolution of parliament. However, in presidential systems, if the president fails to garner the consent of the senate, alternative secretaries may be introduced, ultimately resulting in the formation of the government albeit with a delay. Similarly, in the IRI, the failure to secure an investiture vote does not obstruct the establishment of the government; rather, it simply prolongs the process, potentially leading the president to compromise on proposed ministers in order to expedite government formation. Furthermore, the constitutional requirement to seek an investiture vote for a minister who is removed or resigns, as well as the presidential directive to individually appoint ministers, further emphasizes the resemblance between the investiture vote in the IRI and the appointment confirmation process in presidential systems. ConclusionAs a conclusion, it seems that the investiture vote in the Constitutional of the IRI bears greater resemblance to the appointment confirmation process observed in presidential systems.
Public Law
seyedeh zahra saeid
Abstract
1. IntroductionThe president’s interpellation before the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA), set in the Constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been a challenge. The cause of the challenge is the contrast between the 2nd clause of Article 89 of the Constitution and Article 114 ...
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1. IntroductionThe president’s interpellation before the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA), set in the Constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been a challenge. The cause of the challenge is the contrast between the 2nd clause of Article 89 of the Constitution and Article 114 of the Constitution. Article 89 says: “In the event that at least one-third of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly interpellate the President concerning his responsibilities for leadership of the executive power and managing the executive affairs of the country, the President must present himself to the Assembly within one month after the submission of the interpellation and to give adequate explanations regarding the matters raised. After hearing the statements of the opposing and favoring members and the reply of the President, if two-thirds of the members of the Assembly vote for his incompetency, the vote will be communicated to the Supreme Leader for implementation of Article 110(10)”. Article 114 holds: “The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people. His re-election for a successive term is permissible only once”In other words, The main cause of the challenge is the appointment of the president through elections and the lack of any power by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in this regard. The current presumption among the legal society is that interpellation would be applied to an authority that is elected by the ICA. Although the current presumption is relatively true, what has been neglected during these years is that in fact, the interpellation of the president in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is impeachment in a different, unique concept. Discussion In some political systems, the president would be removed by legislative assemblies by means of impeachment. Comparing the elements of the term impeachment with the elements of interpellation proves the above claim. Hence, comparing the two elements of their grounds and their procedures are notable.in the draft of the Constitution, a two-stage procedure for the removal of the president was set, but after the enactment of the Constitution, two different one-stage procedures were created. One procedure would be run by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the other would be run by the Supreme Court. In fact, two procedures that work together in an impeachment, have been transformed into two independent procedures, both of which leave the final decision-making to the Supreme Leader.ConclusiomThe grounds for the president’s removal have been changed from “treason or conspiracy against national security” in the text of the Constitution to “treason and violation of legal duties” and eventually, to “violation of legal duties” and “lack of qualification”. Lack of qualification and being unfit to continue in office are common concepts among the grounds of impeachment in different political systems. lack of qualifications, incapability in doing his executive duties, or ineptitude in executive management in the text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran are the instances of the general notion of “being unqualified unfit”. Both concepts of “lack of qualification” and “violation of legal duties” are incorporated in the general notion of unfitness in the legal and political literature of the Islamic Republic of Iran and are equal to impeachment in other systems; However, interpellation is often based on political reasons. Since the causes and the grounds of the president’s removal are enumerated in the Constitution, we can conclude that the nature of presidential removal in the Constitution is impeachment, but its title is interpellation.Thus, some clarification and some reforms are required by amending the Constitution. Before any constitutional amendment, the nature of the interpellation of the president and its elements should be explained by the legal society. It may prevent this oversight tool to become a reason to remove the president based on political disagreements and may regulate and restrict the oversight tool to only clear legal grounds. This may, in the future, be the inspiration to possibly omit or add to the grounds for presidential removal in the constitutional amendment. According to the current laws and regulations, the procedure of presidential removal via Islamic Consultative Assembly is almost clear but the procedure of presidential removal through the Supreme Court is unclear. Again, reforming the procedure of presidential removal and merging the two procedures requires an amendment to the Constitution. Another subject that must be considered is the effect of this presidential removal mechanism and whether, irrespective of the removal from office, there are any other effects and sanctions for the president or not. Another sanction for the president’s incompetency would be exclusion and prohibition from holding any public office which is worthy to be debated and considered for the future.
