Recent developments of concept and instances of rights have given rise to
many chanllenges among legal theorists, each of them has attempted to
tackle the challenges in his/her particular way. It is claimed that in order
for us to have a better life it is no longer possible to merely rely on the
first and second generations of rights. It is, necessary to (generate or
establish) another generation of rights that is commensurate with
requirments of the collective life. This necessity has been the basis on
which the idea of third generation rights has been established. Now, in
order to deal with claims under third generation rights – which are also
called group, collective or peoples – we are, first, required to put forth a
clear undeatanding of the concept of third generation rights. It is, then,
essential to deal with theoretical foundations of these rights. In this
regard, we endeavour to answer certain fundamental questions on these
rights: what does third generation rights mean? What are their instances?
Are we allowed to use the title of ‘rights’ for claims made under
collective life per se? What are the arguments of proponents of this kind
of rights? Are the arguments tenable? If not, what is the altertanative
analysis?