Public Law
Javad Yahyazadeh; Hassan Vakilian
Abstract
IntroductionThe concept of constitutional unamendability holds paramount significance within a constitutional framework. A constitution sets out the fundamental rules of a society, and its amendment procedures specify how those rules may be modified. In this respect, provisions on unamendability can ...
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IntroductionThe concept of constitutional unamendability holds paramount significance within a constitutional framework. A constitution sets out the fundamental rules of a society, and its amendment procedures specify how those rules may be modified. In this respect, provisions on unamendability can be understood as the principles that govern how fundamental rules may be changed. As such, they constitute one of the most crucial elements of any constitution. Unamendability has drawn growing global attention and is now recognized, in both codified and uncodified forms, by numerous constitutional systems. It operates to restrain political actors and the public from engaging in revision efforts, effectively transforming attempts to alter fundamental constitutional principles into long-term prohibitions.Republicanism in France and Italy, human dignity in Germany and Armenia, fundamental rights in Central Africa and Brazil, secularism in Azerbaijan and Turkey, and religion in Algeria and Iran are among the many examples of unamendable constitutional principles. Constitutional unamendability, as one of the most important elements of a constitution, has increasingly captured the attention of constitutional drafters in both constitutional and even non-constitutional systems. Any theory about constitutional unamendability must address two fundamental questions.First, what is the legal logic underlying constitutional unamendability? Second, which parts of a constitution should be considered unamendable? The concepts of unamendability as a derived constituent power and of transnational unamendability, viewed through the lens of universal constitutionalism, offer persuasive answers to these questions. Yet the precise answer to each ultimately depends on resolving a prior question: What, exactly, is constitutional unamendability? In Iran, the theoretical refinement of constitutional unamendability is particularly significant and urgent, specifically due to the emergence of a certain consensus among political actors, as well as legal and non-legal doctrines, regarding the question of constitutional revision. The present study aimed to offer a unified and consistent theory of constitutional unamendability by examining the nature of constitutional unamendability, exploring its legal logic, and presenting a normative approach regarding the unamendable content of the constitution. The analysis focused on constitutional unamendability in Iran. Literature ReviewA review of the Persian-language research reveals that scholars of constitutional law in Iran have not devoted sustained, independent attention to the theory of constitutional unamendability. Secondary sources typically offer only limited discussions of its legitimacy or illegitimacy, without undertaking a comprehensive or in-depth analysis. These works often arrive at a broad and somewhat superficial conclusion: constitutional unamendability is incompatible with democratic principles and the right to self-determination, and is therefore unacceptable. Notable examples of scholarship in this area include “The Right to Self-Determination in International Human Rights Law and Ultra-Constitutional Principles” (Mohebbi & Najafabadi, 2020) and “Theoretical Foundations of the Basic Constitutional Review” (Ghamami & Hosseini, 2019). Materials and MethodsThe present study employed a library research method for data collection and a normative method for data analysis. It was structured into three interconnected sections, each contributing to the development of a coherent theory. The first section examined the nature of constitutional unamendability. The second explored the legal logic underlying constitutional unamendability. Finally, the third section presented a normative approach regarding the unamendable content of the constitution.Results and Discussion The theory of constitutional unamendability seeks to legitimize the scope and limits of explicit and implicit constraints on constitutional revision by drawing a terminological distinction between revision and amendment, defining revision as an exercise of derived constituent power, and adopting a universalist understanding of constitutionalism.This theory is expressed through three principles: a restricted obligation of unamendability for core constitutional values, the permissibility of unamendability for intermediate values, and an absolute prohibition on unamendability for anti-constitutional values. An examination of Article 177 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran showed that the Iranian legislator has effectively adopted a logic of unamendability that differs from the transnational understanding. Although the republican values enshrined in Article 177 can be interpreted—at a textual and superficial level—in a way that aligns with universal constitutionalism, the Islamic values it protects emphasize an originalist and holographic understanding of the legal and political order of the Islamic Republic, thereby reflecting an approach to unamendability that diverges from transnational unamendability. ConclusionThe growing significance of constitutional unamendability has made it a complex and contentious mechanism for imposing constraints on constitutional revision. The theoretical and practical challenges arising at three levels—institutional design, judicial review, and political interaction—are closely tied to fundamental concepts and the emergence of new constitutional rights. As a result, it is now imperative to conceptualize constitutional unamendability in a manner that produces a theory capable of shaping constitutional thought.A theory of constitutional unamendability must provide convincing answers to two central questions. First, it must explain the legal logic underlying constitutional unamendability. Second, it must identify which constitutional elements should be considered unamendable. Addressing these questions depends on a clear understanding of the concept of constitutional unamendability itself.The present inquiry sought to advance the theoretical exploration of constitutional unamendability by offering integrated and coherent responses to these questions. It is feasible to establish a distinction between revision and amendment through lexical analysis and an examination of the nature, characteristics, content, and guarantees of constitutional unamendability. This can provide the conceptual foundation necessary for understanding and theorizing constitutional unamendability.Understanding the legal logic underlying constitutional unamendability rests on recognizing constitutional amendment as a derived constituent power within the conventional theory of constitutional amendment. It further requires differentiating constituent power from constituted power and substantiating this distinction through an analysis of three major approaches: substantive, procedural, and delegated. The theory also engages with the notion of transnational unamendability, grounded in a universalist interpretation of constitutionalism, and provides justification for both explicit and implicit limits on amendment. The implications of transnational unamendability are reflected in a restricted obligation of unamendability for core constitutional values, the permissibility of unamendability for intermediate values, and an absolute prohibition on unamendability for anti-constitutional values.
International Law
Sassan Seyrafi; Asma Salari
Abstract
Introduction
Among the challenges facing the global community is the urgent need to reduce global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions—which results in climate change—while at same time meeting the world’s increasing demand for energy. Shifting energy production from non-renewable ...
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Introduction
Among the challenges facing the global community is the urgent need to reduce global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions—which results in climate change—while at same time meeting the world’s increasing demand for energy. Shifting energy production from non-renewable to renewable sources is widely regarded as one of the most effective ways to mitigate global warming and address the climate crisis. Marine renewable energy refers to renewable energy derived from various natural resources in the marine environment. It encompasses four main types: ocean energy obtained from the kinetic or chemical energy of seawater (e.g., waves, tides, and ocean currents), geothermal energy derived from submarine geothermal resources, bioenergy generated from marine biomass, and wind energy from turbines installed in offshore areas. While the first three types are still at different stages of research and development, marine wind energy—commonly referred to as offshore wind energy—has already been commercialized on an industrial scale. Wind energy is generated both onshore and offshore; however, offshore wind currently represents only about 7 percent of global installed wind power capacity. This limited share is primarily due to the significantly higher cost of generating electricity offshore compared to onshore production. Despite these challenges, the offshore wind industry continues to expand, as wind resources generally increase with distance from the shore, resulting in greater energy output. Nevertheless, greater distance also means deeper waters, which substantially raise the costs of offshore wind projects. From the perspective of the Law of the Sea, the establishment of offshore wind farms in relatively shallow waters means that these installations are primarily located within the territorial sea of coastal states. However, as offshore wind projects expand into deeper waters, an increasing number of such installations are expected to be constructed within the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of coastal states. The unique legal regime of the EEZ—set out in Part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—raises a range of questions regarding the regulation of various aspects of offshore renewable energy activities within the EEZ. In addition to issues concerning its legal status under the EEZ regime, offshore wind energy development in the EEZ presents two principal challenges under the Law of the Sea: ensuring navigational safety and safeguarding the marine environment. In light of these focal points, the current study sought to examine offshore wind power production within the EEZ from the perspective of the Law of the Sea.
Literature Review
Despite the significant growth of the offshore wind sector over the past two decades, the body of international legal literature on offshore wind energy production remains relatively limited. In particular, there appears to be a scarcity of studies specifically addressing offshore wind production within the EEZ. In Persian legal scholarship, Rezaee (2017) provides an overview of the rights and duties of states concerning the development of marine renewable energies. In “Rights and Duties of Countries in Using Marine Renewable Energies,” Rezaee (2017) offers a concise discussion of renewable energy activities in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. In English-language legal literature, Scott (2006) examined wind energy generation in the EEZ with reference to issues such as navigational safety and marine environmental protection. However, the analysis primarily focused on U.K. domestic law rather than on international law. Other scholars (e.g., Castelos, 2014; Crossley, 2019; Neves, 2021; Young, 2015) explored marine renewable energy within the broader context of the Law of the Sea, briefly addressing how offshore wind production in the EEZ is regulated under that framework. Similarly, Scovazzi and Tani (2014) and Giannopoulos (2018) focused on the environmental dimensions of offshore energy production. Overall, there remains a notable gap in the legal literature concerning a comprehensive and independent examination of offshore wind energy production within the EEZ.
Materials and Methods
The present study aimed to identify and analyze the Law of the Sea rules governing offshore energy production within the EEZ. It adopted a doctrinal approach and an analytical–descriptive method to examine the normative content of relevant legal sources. The data was collected primarily through library-based research. The analysis began with the UNCLOS, which provides the fundamental international legal framework for all activities conducted in the EEZ. In addition, various other binding and non-binding international instruments were examined. These included resolutions adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as well as law-making treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention) and its 1996 Protocol, and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS Convention), among others.
Results and Discussion
The UNCLOS provides a comprehensive legal framework for wind energy production within the EEZ. The provisions of Part V of UNCLOS, which establish the legal regime of the EEZ, set out the fundamental principles regulating offshore wind energy development. In essence, the coastal state enjoys an exclusive sovereign right over all forms of marine energy production in its EEZ, including electricity generation from offshore wind turbines. Accordingly, the coastal state possesses the exclusive right to construct, authorize, and regulate the construction, operation, and use of offshore wind farms within its EEZ. Furthermore, the coastal state exercises full jurisdiction over installations and structures associated with offshore wind energy plants. With respect to maritime safety, Article 60 of UNCLOS lays down the basic provisions concerning the safety of offshore structures and installations, which also apply to wind farms. These provisions are complemented by the more detailed requirements contained in IMO Resolutions A.671(16) and A.672(16)—both adopted in 1989—which are considered binding through the so-called rule of reference. In addition, soft-law instruments such as the International Organization for Marine Aids to Navigation (IALA) Council Recommendation R0139 (O-139) and IALA Guideline G1162 provide practical guidance on the marking of offshore wind farms. Concerning the protection of the marine environment, the coastal state’s obligations under Part XII of UNCLOS—particularly Articles 192, 193, and 194—require it to protect and preserve the marine environment of the EEZ from the adverse effects of offshore wind energy activities. These obligations are reinforced by other international instruments, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS Convention). These environmental obligations are characterized as due diligence obligations, meaning that the coastal state must take all necessary measures to prevent offshore energy activities in the EEZ from causing harm to the environment of other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction. The duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm is further supported by the procedural obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment for offshore wind farm projects. Finally, with respect to the decommissioning of offshore wind farms in the EEZ, the relevant rules and procedures established under the London Convention, as amended by the 1996 Protocol, must be complied with.
5. Conclusion
Overall, it seems that there are no significant legal lacunae that would hinder the development of offshore wind energy production in the EEZ, as its principal aspects are regulated by UNCLOS and a range of other relevant legal instruments.
Environmental law
Masoud Faryadi
Abstract
Introduction
Iran’s forests are at risk of destruction due to uncontrolled tree cutting. For this reason, after enacting several protective laws over the past century, the legislature ultimately decided to prohibit the harvesting of forest trees. The Plan to Cease Forest Logging (PCFL) was ...
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Introduction
Iran’s forests are at risk of destruction due to uncontrolled tree cutting. For this reason, after enacting several protective laws over the past century, the legislature ultimately decided to prohibit the harvesting of forest trees. The Plan to Cease Forest Logging (PCFL) was first introduced in Article 38 of Law on the Sixth Development Plan and more recently reiterated in Article 36 of Law on the Seventh Progress Plan. Under the PCFL, the logging of wood from natural forest trees is prohibited, and the wood industry must meet its needs through damaged trees and plantations. On the one hand, implementing PCFL helps protect the country’s vulnerable forests and encourages industries to seek alternatives to cutting down natural trees. On the other hand, the legal system and the method of implementation face challenges that must be identified and solved. Since PCFL has not yet been examined from a legal perspective, a preliminary discussion is necessary to identify legal challenges and offer recommendations. In this respect, the present research aimed to examine the legal foundations of PCFL and to propose regulatory solutions aimed at protecting the nation’s forests and promoting sustainable development.
Literature Review
Very few legal studies have examined the legal issues surrounding Iran’s forests or the sustainable development of the wood industry. Likewise, the legal dimensions of PCFL have not yet been the subject of serious research. However, the article titled “Legal Gaps in the Development of Wood Farming in Iran” (Faryadi, 2023) is the only relevant research which explored the legal challenges related to halting tree-logging plans and supplying wood for industry.
Materials and Methods
The current study used the descriptive–analytical and legal pathology methods to examine the 2024 Law on the Seventh Progress Plan, along with other relevant laws and regulations. The analysis focused on the significance of PCFL, forest conservation, and the legislative and implementation challenges involved.
Results and Discussion
The analysis examined the advantages and challenges of Law on the Seventh Progress Plan and its approach to cease forest logging in light of the principle of sustainable development. It proposed the adoption of a comprehensive and integrated legal framework to establish a new legal order for protecting the country’s forests, the approval of detailed executive regulations to regulate the new forest management plan, and the sustainable supply of wood. It is essential for the Natural Resources and Watershed Management Organization, in collaboration with other relevant institutions, to prepare a draft executive bylaw for Article 36 of Law on the Seventh Progress Plan. This draft should be grounded in scientific studies and clearly outline institutional responsibilities, forest restoration and development measures, sustainable management of timber cultivation, and the mechanisms for meeting industrial wood demand. Once prepared, it should be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval. However, before taking these steps, a long-term strategy for forest protection—one that simultaneously addresses the country’s wood needs—is needed to establish a coherent framework for forest management. It is thus advisable to review Law on the Seventh Progress Plan alongside Law on the Protection and Exploitation of Forests and Rangelands, and to amend and update both laws in accordance with new requirements, particularly the cessation of forest logging and the future provision of the country’s wood needs.
Conclusion
The study concludes that legal ambiguities, conflicts, and the lack of detailed regulations and long-term strategies for forest management pose serious obstacles to the effectiveness of this legal mechanism. If these legal challenges are not addressed in subsequent laws and regulations, and if the status and application of previous forest-related legislation remain unclear, Iran’s forests will continue to face the threat of unauthorized cutting. Moreover, the implementation will encounter difficulties, and the wood industry will struggle to secure the wood it needs. Such conditions may create opportunities for criminal activity and increase the likelihood of illegal logging for economic gain.
Public Law
navid sheydaei ashtiani; Bijan Abbasi
Abstract
1. Introduction
During more than four decades since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, several councils have been established that have had a significant impact on the country’s constitutional structure. The first of these was the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, created a few ...
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1. Introduction
During more than four decades since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, several councils have been established that have had a significant impact on the country’s constitutional structure. The first of these was the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, created a few months after the Islamic Revolution, when the Islamic Consultative Assembly had not yet begun its activities. Another important example is the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, established by order of the Supreme Leader in 2012 to formulate major policies and decisions related to cyberspace. The influence of these institutions should not be underestimated, as they have directly and indirectly shaped the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Typically, any constitution has two primary functions: defining the organization of state powers and recognizing the fundamental rights and liberties of the people. The changes brought about by these councils touch on both of these aspects. The present study aimed to evaluate the impact of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace on the constitutional framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This council is especially significant because, although the Constitution does not explicitly mention it, it plays a remarkable role in governance. While it appears to act merely as a policymaking body, in practice it sometimes assumes legislative functions—powers that the Constitution does not formally grant it. Therefore, these councils warrant careful attention. Understanding Iran’s constitutional law is impossible without assessing the influence of these councils. They have actually created a living constitution that we live by.
Literature Review
Several articles have offered the legal analysis of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace. These studies include: “The Multiplicity of Legislative Bodies Emphasizing the Position of Supreme Council of Cyberspace Approvals in Iranian Legal System” (Moradkhani & Takaloo, 2021), “The Jurisdiction of the General Board of the Administrative Court of Justice” (Darvishvand, 2023), and “Monitoring the Approvals of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace in the Legal System of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Pirniya & Abrishami-Rad, 2023). These studies address the Council primarily from a constitutional law perspective.
Materials and Methods
The present study employed library research to collect data. Then a descriptive–analytical method was used to analyze the data.
Results and Discussion
The Supreme Council of Cyberspace has dismembered the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran in two significant ways. First, the Constitution guarantees the right to vote and the right to be elected; however, the members of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace are not selected through a public or national election. Second, the Constitution establishes only two valid avenues for lawmaking: through the Islamic Consultative Assembly and, in exceptional cases, by referendum as outlined in Article 59, which states: “In very important economic, political, social, and cultural issues, the exercise of legislative power may be carried out through a referendum and direct reference to the people. The request for a referendum must be approved by two-thirds of all members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.” Accordingly, any imposition of rules or restrictions by institutions acting as legislative bodies, beyond those authorized in Articles 58 and 59, is unconstitutional. Since the Supreme Council of Cyberspace functions in practice as a legislative body, its actions represent a direct dismemberment of the constitutional framework.
Conclusion
The study examined the timing and context of the establishment of the Supreme Cyberspace Council, its structure, and its developments. The analysis outlined the circumstances surrounding the Council’s establishment and highlighted certain conflicts between the Council and other organizations that existed at the time. The concept of constitutional change was also introduced in general terms, and a distinction was made between formal and informal constitutional changes. Finally, the study focused on the concept of constitutional dismemberment and analyzed the effects of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace on Iran’s constitutional order.
Public Law
Meisa Kamyab
Abstract
Introduction
The discussion of judicial empathy forms part of the longstanding debate over the dichotomy between emotion and reason, in which emotions are often portrayed as unruly, destabilizing forces incompatible with the rule of law. Although empathy has become a common term in critical studies, ...
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Introduction
The discussion of judicial empathy forms part of the longstanding debate over the dichotomy between emotion and reason, in which emotions are often portrayed as unruly, destabilizing forces incompatible with the rule of law. Although empathy has become a common term in critical studies, it is rarely defined or described, and is usually assessed only as a positive concept contrasted with something negative or undesirable. Once introduced into the legal sphere, however, the term acquires a limited and complex meaning for several reasons. The separation between ethics and law, the substantive differences between judging and therapeutic practice, and concerns about maintaining the rule of law and equal treatment all contribute to skepticism toward incorporating empathy into judicial proceedings. There is no doubt that empathy plays an important role in social life; however, the central issue in scholarship on law and emotion concerns the role that empathy should play in the judicial process. In this respect, the current study argued that debating whether judges ought to possess empathy is ultimately futile, because they inevitably rely on this emotional capacity. A judge employs empathy as a tool to understand conflicting claims. Empathy enables judges to grasp the perspectives of both parties in a dispute; however, it does not determine the outcome of a case or favor one side over the other. The key questions, therefore, concern toward whom judges should direct their empathy, how they should express it, and the extent to which they recognize its limitations. Accordingly, this study first defined empathy, then examined the arguments of both its proponents and its critics. It went on to provide examples of empathetic perspectives in judicial proceedings. Affirming empathy as an essential emotional capacity, the study finally proposed strategies for cultivating an empathetic judiciary.
Literature Review
Scholarship on law and emotion began to gain prominence with the publication of a volume titled The Passions of Law (Bandes, 1999). The contributors to this volume sought to trace the influence of emotions across various domains of law. In Hiding From Humanity, Nussbaum (2004) approached the relationship between law and emotion from a philosophical standpoint. She drew attention to the emotions of disgust and shame and warned against their use in law because they stem from an unrealistic desire to avoid vulnerability. The volume Law, Reason, and Emotion (Sellers, 2017) treated emotion as one of the forces that shapes and strengthens the law. In “The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion,” Maroney (2011) highlighted the persistent ideal of judicial dispassion by investigating its historical roots. She then dealt with legal actors, judicial temperament, and emotion regulation, distinguishing her work from more philosophical accounts by grounding it in neuroscientific research. White (2014), in “Till Human Voices Wake Us,” examined human dignity cases, referred to emotions as indispensable for reaching just decisions, identifying their roles as “orientation, tracker, and service” (p. 201). There are also several studies on law and emotion in the Iranian context. For instance, Kamyab and Jalali (2022) in “Law and Emotion: The Implications of Neuroscience for Legal Decision-Making” sought to initiate the discussion on the role of emotions in legal decision-making and moral judgment. Empirical evidence proved that mirror neurons—a shared neural mechanism—form the evolutionary basis of empathy and constitute a common language for understanding rights. In “Loss of Free Will in the Iranian Criminal Justice System,” Petoft et al. (2023) examined the role and reliability of neuroscientific evidence in legal proceedings. Despite these valuable contributions, a gap remains regarding how empathetic responses should be incorporated into the law, particularly in judicial decision-making. The current research aimed to address that gap by clarifying the concept of empathy and examining the challenges and misconceptions surrounding its use in judicial discourse.
Materials and Methods
This study falls within the field of normative legal research. Normative legal theory aims to provide a self-sufficient account of the law, its concepts, and its principles. The present analysis adopted a legal–doctrinal approach within the broader law and emotion scholarship, seeking to explore how emotion is, could be, or should be reflected in specific areas of legal doctrine or law. It also employed an approach about the legal actor to examine how the behavior of particular legal actors—in carrying out their legal functions—is, could be, or should be influenced by emotion.
Results and Discussion
Empathy should not only be permitted within the legal professions and judicial practice, but actively encouraged in the interest of equality and the rule of law. As an emotional capacity, empathy serves both as a source of understanding in legal proceedings and as a tool for interpretation. However, legal education can impede the development of empathetic responses in judging, as it often treats factors such as emotion as irrelevant. This view within legal discourse restricts both emotional and cognitive engagement, leading to the marginalization of empathetic understanding. Human beings inevitably rely on empathy, yet even with the best intentions, this empathy is often selective and prone to blind spots. Awareness of this tendency allows us to strive for correction. However, research in cognitive psychology and decision-making indicates that human beings are not always adept at identifying or challenging flaws in their own assumptions in interactions with others. Judges, like all humans, make better decisions when they critically re-examine their assumptions. Yet this re-examination does not occur in a vacuum. A judge who fails to recognize empathy as a prerequisite for fair judgment faces significant challenges in reaching an empathetic decision. Therefore, cultivating and encouraging empathy is essential, alongside promoting pluralism in judicial appointments.
Conclusion
The life experience of any individual is limited; in addition, their perspectives are shaped by the contexts in which they are raised. It is thus unrealistic to expect a judge to fully empathize with all parties involved in a case. Therefore, structuring courts with multiple judges can introduce diverse perspectives into the adjudication process. Measures such as incorporating empathy into judicial training, promoting diversity and plurality in judicial appointments, and encouraging legal storytelling are approaches that can help cultivate a more empathetic judiciary. Storytelling is an important approach to foster empathetic judging. Narratives capture real human experiences and can serve as powerful tools for promoting empathetic understanding. A tangible story often illustrates lived experiences more effectively than abstract theory, encouraging judges to respond with genuine care and empathy. Advocates of legal storytelling and empathetic decision-making tend to share two key concerns. First, legal theory and discourse have become increasingly detached from individual experiences. Academics, judges, and lawyers often focus on general concepts and abstractions, neglecting the human realities underlying the law. Narratives, by contrast, heighten the sensitivity of legal actors to these realities, presenting life as it is rather than as the law describes it. By bringing the law closer to people’s lived experiences and giving voice to the less heard, narratives guide legal actors toward more empathetic responses. Every judge and legal actor should take both their own and others’ emotional experiences seriously. By engaging in open discussion, acknowledging these emotions, and embracing judicial empathy, they can contribute to the advancement of scholarship in the field of aw and emotion.
Public Law
seyedeh zahra saeid
Abstract
1. Introduction
Political systems can be classified according to various parameters and variables. Among the key concepts used to explain and distinguish political systems are the notions of unified government and divided government. These concepts, widely discussed in political science, are also valuable ...
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1. Introduction
Political systems can be classified according to various parameters and variables. Among the key concepts used to explain and distinguish political systems are the notions of unified government and divided government. These concepts, widely discussed in political science, are also valuable in the study of fundamental rights due to the close relationship between the two fields. Explaining political systems through the lens of unified and divided governments provides clearer insight into the relationship between the branches of power. A unified government exists when the political alignment between the executive and legislative branches is structurally guaranteed. In contrast, a divided government occurs when the processes by which the executive and the legislature come to power do not ensure political alignment between them. Furthermore, when disagreement or division arises between the president and the prime minister within the executive branch, the result is a divided government within the executive itself. Unified elections for both the government and the parliament tend to produce a unified government, whereas separate elections for these bodies often lead to a divided government. Similarly, periods of cohabitation of the president and the prime minister create a divided government within the political system. In general, parliamentary systems emerge as a result of a unified government, while presidential systems are characterized by a divided government between the executive and the legislature. A semi-presidential system results from a divided government within the executive branch. Applying these concepts can help identify the nature of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Analyzing Iran’s political system in two periods—before and after the constitutional amendment—through the lens of political science theories provides insights that differ from those found in the works and interpretations of legal scholars.
Literature Review
Regarding the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, both Iran’s constitutional law and comparative constitutional law literature briefly refer to it as a semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary–semi-presidential model. Several scholarly articles have also characterized the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran as semi-presidential in nature. A common feature among these analyses is their focus on the parliament’s constitutional oversight mechanisms over the government. However, none of the previous studies have examined the relationship between the government and the parliament within the framework of political science concepts such as unified government and divided government. Furthermore, the present study differs from most previous works that have classified the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran according to existing typological models. Concerning the relationship between the government and the parliament, the current analysis aimed to challenge the claim that the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is semi-presidential. Adopting the findings of this study could have far-reaching implications for the political and legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, potentially leading to significant reforms and changes in the relationships among the branches of power.
Materials and Methods
The present study used a critical–analytical approach to address the nature of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Results and Discussion
The theoretical analysis of the relationships within the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran—prior to the constitutional amendment—revealed significant insights. For example, the incorporation of Prime Minister in the Constitution created a unified government between the executive and the legislature. However, in practice, the absence of a clear majority criterion in appointing the prime minister led to recurring conflicts in this regard. At that time, the leadership, the president, and the prime minister together constituted the executive branch. This situation changed following the constitutional amendment approved in 1989, which abolished the position of Prime Minister. As a result, and due to the lack of a mechanism ensuring alignment between the government and the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the system has since exhibited characteristics of a divided government in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Given the constitutional division of executive authority between the Leader and the President, the application of the concept of a divided government within the executive branch itself also warrants consideration. Therefore, the characterization of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran as semi-presidential is inaccurate.
Conclusion
In terms of the relationship between the government and the parliament, the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran more closely resembles a presidential system. To accurately determine the political type of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is essential to analyze the nature of the relationship between the positions of Leader and President, as well as its distinctions from the semi-presidential model.
International Law
Mahdi Haddadi
Abstract
1. IntroductionSeveral centuries have passed since the emergence of the international law system. Over time, the development of international rules has increasingly influenced and regulated numerous aspects of human activity. The expansion of these rules, along with the proliferation of international ...
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1. IntroductionSeveral centuries have passed since the emergence of the international law system. Over time, the development of international rules has increasingly influenced and regulated numerous aspects of human activity. The expansion of these rules, along with the proliferation of international courts, makes it essential to clarify how the rules of international law should be interpreted and applied. In this growing international legal landscape, where customary international law continues to serve as one of the primary sources of international law, little attention has been given to the question of whether it is possible to interpret the rules of customary international law. Throughout history, customary international law has been the subject of extensive research. Studies on the topic continue even within international institutions. For instance, the International Law Society conducted a 16-year project (1984–2000) on the formation of customary international law. Similarly, the International Law Commission (ILC) began a study in 2013 on the recognition of customary international law, completing it in 2018. Although the ILC produced valuable findings—particularly by noting that determining the existence of a customary rule and its content are simultaneous processes—it did not independently address the question of how to determine the content of customary international law or the related issue of its interpretation. In other words, once an unwritten rule is identified, can it then be meaningfully interpreted? Other ILC work that touches on interpretation—such as studies on the fragmentation of international law or subsequent agreements and procedures in treaty interpretation—has never fully explored the intersection of interpretation and customary international law.Although extensive research has been conducted in the areas of treaty interpretation and the formation and recognition of customary international law, the point of convergence between these two fields—namely, the interpretation of customary international law—remains largely unexplored. The almost exclusive focus on the formation of customary international law (considering its two elements of state practice and opinio juris) may help explain this gap. Some jurists, for instance, maintain that customary rules cannot be interpreted, and that only written texts are subject to interpretation. Others take the position that while the rules of customary international law can be identified, they cannot be interpreted. There are two main arguments regarding the interpretability of the rules of customary international law. First, it is argued that interpretation applies only to written rules, and since customary rules are unwritten, they cannot be interpreted. Second, it is claimed that the identification of customary rules is the sole process that determines their content; consequently, any attempt to explain a customary rule would require a new stage of identification. The present study aimed to examine the validity of these arguments by analyzing opinions from both the doctrinal sources and judicial jurisprudence concerning the interpretability of customary international law. The study went on to address the methods by which customary rules can be interpreted, should their interpretability be established.Literature ReviewNo research on this topic exists in Persian, and studies in other languages remain limited. The current inquiry reviewed the main literature on the subject.Materials and MethodsThe present study used a descriptive–analytical method to examine the validity of the arguments about interpretability of the rules of international law. By examining both doctrinal sources and judicial jurisprudence, it ultimately presented the methods for interpreting customary rules. Results and DiscussionThe analysis focused on whether customary rules can be interpreted and, if so, how such interpretation should be carried out. There is no consensus among international law scholars on this issue. Some argue that the development of customary international law involves the intertwined processes of identification, interpretation, and enforcement. Others maintain that customary international law cannot be interpreted because it is unwritten. Despite the challenges and ambiguities associated with custom, its status as a source of international law is unquestioned. A logical question therefore arises: once a customary rule has formed—and aside from the possibility of its modification or termination through subsequent practice and opinio juris—does its inherent ambiguity not necessitate interpretation for its continued application? The very existence of ambiguity and uncertainty—even in written instruments—is what makes interpretation necessary. It is thus counterintuitive to deny the interpretability of norms derived from a source of law that shares these same characteristics. Interpretation, which involves determining the meaning of a legal act, is equally applicable to both written and unwritten rules. In interpreting the law, we interpret social facts, which may be expressed verbally or nonverbally. Moreover, all laws, whether written or unwritten, leave room for uncertainty and therefore for interpretation.In response to the claim that interpreting customary international law can be reduced to identification, it is important to distinguish between rule identification and content determination. Identifying a rule is the process by which a legal norm is recognized, whereas determining its content involves defining the meaning of that norm. Although these two processes are often intertwined and complementary in practice, they remain conceptually distinct. Regarding the method of interpretation of customary rules, it was clarified that although Regarding the methods for interpreting customary rules, although Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply only to treaty interpretation, the interpretive techniques they contain have acquired a customary character and have been used in various contexts to interpret acts that are not treaties. They are employed, for example, in interpreting unilateral acts, declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and Security Council resolutions. What these cases have in common is that Articles 31 and 32 are not applied strictly; rather, they are applied mutatis mutandis, with due regard for the specific nature of the acts being interpreted. This approach appears equally appropriate for the interpretation of customary rules. ConclusionIt can be concluded that customary international law, like written law, requires interpretation due to its inherently general and often ambiguous nature. The distinction between identifying a rule and determining its content underscores that interpretation is an independent and indispensable process. Moreover, the interpretative methods developed in treaty law, when appropriately adapted, can also be applied to customary norms. Accordingly, denying theinterpretability of customary law is neither theoretically convincing nor practically viable, whereas acknowledging it contributes to greater coherence and effectiveness within the international legal system.
Public Law
Mohaamad Shaabani Jahromi; Mohammad Bahadori jahromi; Alireza Mazinani
Abstract
1. Introduction
Political systems can be classified according to various parameters and variables. Among the key concepts used to explain and distinguish political systems are the notions of unified government and divided government. These concepts, widely discussed in political science, are also valuable ...
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1. Introduction
Political systems can be classified according to various parameters and variables. Among the key concepts used to explain and distinguish political systems are the notions of unified government and divided government. These concepts, widely discussed in political science, are also valuable in the study of fundamental rights due to the close relationship between the two fields. Explaining political systems through the lens of unified and divided governments provides clearer insight into the relationship between the branches of power. A unified government exists when the political alignment between the executive and legislative branches is structurally guaranteed. In contrast, a divided government occurs when the processes by which the executive and the legislature come to power do not ensure political alignment between them. Furthermore, when disagreement or division arises between the president and the prime minister within the executive branch, the result is a divided government within the executive itself. Unified elections for both the government and the parliament tend to produce a unified government, whereas separate elections for these bodies often lead to a divided government. Similarly, periods of cohabitation of the president and the prime minister create a divided government within the political system. In general, parliamentary systems emerge as a result of a unified government, while presidential systems are characterized by a divided government between the executive and the legislature. A semi-presidential system results from a divided government within the executive branch. Applying these concepts can help identify the nature of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Analyzing Iran’s political system in two periods—before and after the constitutional amendment—through the lens of political science theories provides insights that differ from those found in the works and interpretations of legal scholars.
Literature Review
Regarding the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, both Iran’s constitutional law and comparative constitutional law literature briefly refer to it as a semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary–semi-presidential model. Several scholarly articles have also characterized the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran as semi-presidential in nature. A common feature among these analyses is their focus on the parliament’s constitutional oversight mechanisms over the government. However, none of the previous studies have examined the relationship between the government and the parliament within the framework of political science concepts such as unified government and divided government. Furthermore, the present study differs from most previous works that have classified the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran according to existing typological models. Concerning the relationship between the government and the parliament, the current analysis aimed to challenge the claim that the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is semi-presidential. Adopting the findings of this study could have far-reaching implications for the political and legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, potentially leading to significant reforms and changes in the relationships among the branches of power.
Materials and Methods
The present study used a critical–analytical approach to address the nature of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Results and Discussion
The theoretical analysis of the relationships within the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran—prior to the constitutional amendment—revealed significant insights. For example, the incorporation of Prime Minister in the Constitution created a unified government between the executive and the legislature. However, in practice, the absence of a clear majority criterion in appointing the prime minister led to recurring conflicts in this regard. At that time, the leadership, the president, and the prime minister together constituted the executive branch. This situation changed following the constitutional amendment approved in 1989, which abolished the position of Prime Minister. As a result, and due to the lack of a mechanism ensuring alignment between the government and the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the system has since exhibited characteristics of a divided government in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Given the constitutional division of executive authority between the Leader and the President, the application of the concept of a divided government within the executive branch itself also warrants consideration. Therefore, the characterization of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran as semi-presidential is inaccurate.
Conclusion
In terms of the relationship between the government and the parliament, the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran more closely resembles a presidential system. To accurately determine the political type of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is essential to analyze the nature of the relationship between the positions of Leader and President, as well as its distinctions from the semi-presidential model.
