نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه حقوق عمومی و بین‌الملل دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران

چکیده

از جمله برجسته ­ترین صورت ­بندی­ های نوکانتی امر حقوقی در دوران معاصر از سوی رونالد دورکین ارائه شده است. انگاره وی از مسیر ناهمدلی با جدایی امر حقوقی از امر اخلاقی که دستامده اندیشه اثبات‌گرایان است، تأثیرات خود را بر فلسفه مدرن حقوق عمیقاً به ­جای نهاده است. از سوی دیگر فلسفه کانتی با توسل به یک نظام متافیزیک عقل­گرای سیاسی، جامعه اخلاقی را بنا می ­نهد که در آن امر سیاسی تابع امر اخلاقی است. در این سازگان اندیشگانی، بازبینی امر سیاسی در پرتو یک دولت اخلاق­ محور در کانون توجه قرار گرفته است. این نوشتار با استفاده از روش تحلیل محتوا ضمن کوشش در تبیین اندیشه ­های دورکین در باب امر حقوقی که نزد وی دارای ماهیتی تفسیری و غایت­گرا است، نشان می‌دهد که چگونه تأملات و اندیشه ­های وی از آبشخور نظرگاه ­های کانت سیراب می ­گردد. اخلاق غایت­گرا، ارج نهادن به انسانیت و همگرایی و خرد یکپارچه به ­مثابه ابزاری در خدمت انسانیت، زمینه ­های مشترک اندیشه ­های کانت و دورکین است که دست­ آخر با حرکت از سوی همگرایی ­حقوقی به گونه ­ای همگرایی سیاسی مبتنی بر اخلاق که در آن توجه و احترام برابر برای افراد در کانون حکمرانی قرار می­ گیرد، نگاهی نو در باب حاکمیت را برمی­ سازد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Legal as The Interpretive; Reading Dworkin's Legal Theory in the Light of Kant's Ideas

نویسنده [English]

  • Mahdi Moradi Berelian

Assistant Professor, Department of Public and International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran

چکیده [English]

Introduction

One of the most significant contributions to the legal is the concept developed by Ronald Dworkin. His views on interpretation, ethics, human rights, politics, and the legal system form a unified framework, which is most clearly articulated in his later work Justice for Hedgehogs (2011). These insights provide a valuable understanding of the nature of the legal. Teleological ethics, the value of humanity, and reason as a tool in the service of humanity, all form the common ground between Kant’s and Dworkin’s ideas. This perspective shifts the focus from moral–legal integrity to political integrity rooted in ethics, where equal concern and respect for individuals become central to governance. In turn, this opens a new perspective on the nature of governance. The present study tried to answer the following questions: What is the nature of the legal according to Dworkin? How does Dworkin’s conception of the legal relate to Kant’s idea of the inherent dignity of human beings? And what are the implications of adopting Dworkin’s approach to the legal and the moral for political issues and governance?

Literature Review

There are few studies in Persian, but they do not thoroughly examine Dworkin’s legal theory in light of Kant’s ideas.

Materials and Methods

The present study employed a descriptive–analytical research method. In explaining Dworkin’s legal theory, it tried to provide a comprehensive analysis and demonstrate the Kantian foundations underlying his theory.

Results and Discussion

Dworkin argues that the legal system encompasses not only specific rules established through societal procedures but also principles that offer the most compelling moral justification for those rules. From this perspective, the concept of law is understood as an interpretive concept, and both the legal system and law itself are regarded as parts of political morality. A deeper understanding of Ronald Dworkin’s legal and political philosophy is achieved by recognizing Kant as a cornerstone of his thought. Indeed, Dworkin’s conception of law and politics cannot be fully grasped without reference to a Kantian or Neo-Kantian framework. In Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin draws on Kant’s idea that true self-respect is expressed through equal respect for the humanity of all individuals, thus linking ethics with morality. This reflects Kant’s fundamental emphasis on moral lawfulness, which Dworkin highlights in his work. A more precise reading of Dworkin’s claim is that both individuals and political communities ought to act in accordance with principles that embody a morally appropriate conception of law. This corresponds to his notion of law as integrity, which echoes Kant’s moral imperative to act according to internal principles or general rules that take legal form and are objectively binding on all individuals. For Dworkin, the principles of human dignity consist of equal concern and equal respect. The principle of equal concern requires that no government can claim legitimacy unless it shows equal attention and concern for the well-being of every individual under its authority. The principle of equal respect requires that government honor each person’s right and responsibility to make informed choices about how to live their own life.

Conclusion

The political implications of Dworkin’s ideas, which link legal integrity to political integrity, can be better understood in the context of Kant’s philosophy. Kant regarded humanity not as an end we create or produce, but as an end for the sake of which we act. To act for humanity as an intrinsic end requires adopting an attitude that properly acknowledges its value. Within Dworkin’s conceptual framework, humanity is precisely such an end—one that must be taken seriously. This necessitates treating it as the constraining factor of our pursuit of both immediate and ultimate ends. These limits establish acceptable principles of action that take the form of law, that is, systematic, comprehensive, and equally applicable to all in similar circumstances. This requirement or limitation is what Dworkin identifies as political integrity. A failure to act with integrity constitutes a failure to meet the formal condition of respecting human dignity. Integrity, in turn, serves the ideal of equality, under which all citizens should be subject to the same benefits and limitations arising from a coherent system of political principles. From a Kantian perspective, treating humanity as an intrinsic end requires aligning the actions and decisions of the political community with universal laws that express equal concern and respect for all individuals.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • The Moral
  • The Political
  • Humanity
  • Integrity
  • Teleologism
  • کتاب‌ها

    • بیکس، برایان، «نظریه حقوق طبیعی»، ترجمه یحیی شعبانی در پترسن، دنیس، (گردآورنده) مکاتب معاصر فلسفه حقوق: کتاب راهنمای بلک­ول برای فلسفه حقوق، ویراسته محمدمهدی ذوالقدری، ترجمه یحیی شعبانی و دیگران، چاپ اول، (تهران: ترجمان علوم انسانی، 1395).
    • تانسیو، توربرن شناختِ اخلاق: درآمدی به نظریه اخلاقی، ترجمه احسان پورخیری و هیمن برین، چاپ اول (تهران: انتشارات حکمت، 1397).
    • تبیت، مارک، فلسفه حقوق، ترجمه حسن رضایی خاوری، چاپ دوم (مشهد: دانشگاه علوم اسلامی رضوی، 1386).
    • دورکین، رونالد، آیا دموکراسی در آمریکا ممکن است؟ ترجمه محمود حبیبی و خشایار دیهیمی، چاپ اول (تهران: انتشارات مینوی خرد، 1392).
    • کانت، ایمانوئل، ­فلسفه حقوق، ترجمه منوچهر صانعی درّه­بیدی، چاپ سوم (تهران: انتشارات نقش­و­نگار، 1388).
    • مرمور،آندره، تفسیر و نظریه حقوقی، ترجمه محمدحسین جعفری و مهسا شعبانی، چاپ اول (تهران: مجمع علمی و فرهنگی مجد، 1390).
    • نیگل، تامس، اخلاق­شناسی، ترجمه جواد حیدری، چاپ اول (تهران: نشر نگاه معاصر، 1393).

    مقاله

    • مهرآرام، پرهام، «پیوند میان حق و اخلاق در فلسفۀ کانت: آزمون ناوابستگی»، مطالعات حقوقی، دوره 13، شماره 2، (1400).

     

     References

    Books

    • Aharon, Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, Translated from the Hebrew by Sari Bashi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
    • Dworkin, Ronald, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011).
    • Dworkin, Ronald, Justice in Robes, (Cambridge: Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006).
    • Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986).
    • Dworkin, Ronald, “Hard Cases”, in: Taking Rights Seriously, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977).
    • Dworkin, Ronald, “The Model of Rules II”, in: Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977).
    • Guest, Stephen, Ronal Dworkin (Stanford & California: Stanford University Press, 2013).
    • Guyer, Paul, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2005).
    • Hill, Thomas E, “Kantian Perspectives on the Rational Basis of Human Dignity”, in The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Edited by: Marcus Duwell, Jens Braarvic, Roger Brownsword and Deitmar Mieth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
    • Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Translated by: Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
    • Kant, Immanuel, Metaphysics of Morals 1797, Translated by: Mary J Gregor, Practical Philosophy: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
    • Lyons, David, Ethics and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
    • Shapiro, Scott J., “The “Hart–Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed”, in: Ronald Dworkin, Edited by: Arthur Ripstein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
    • Simmonds, Nigel, Law as Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
    • Wood, Allen, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

    Articles

    • Dworkin, Ronald, “Law as Interpretation”, Texas Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 3, (1982).
    • Dworkin, Ronald, “Natural Law Revisited”, University of Florida Law Review, No. 34, (1982).
    • Dworkin, Ronald, “The Model of Rules”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 35, Issue 1, (1967).
    • Hill, Thomas E., “Humanity as an End in Itself”, Ethics, Vol. 91, No. 1, (1980).
    • Hunter, Tina, “Interpretive Theories: Dworkin Sunstein, and Ely”, Bond Law Review, Vol. 17, Issue 2, (2005).
    • Korsgaard, Christine M, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity”, Kant-Studien, Vol. 77, No. 1-4, (1986).
    • MacInnis, Luke, “The Kantian Core of Law as Integrity”, Jurisprudence, 6, Issue. 1, (2015).
    • McCaffery, Edward J, “Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out”, California Law Review, Vol. 85, Issue. 4, (1997).
    • Nalbandian, Elise G., “Notes on Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Law”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, (2009).
    • Van Doren, John W, “Theories of Professors H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin - A Critique”, Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 29, Issue 2, (1980).