نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق عمومی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
2 استاد گروه حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
چکیده
شورای عالی فضای مجازی از جمله شوراهای متعددی است که در ساختار سیاسی ایران شکل گرفته است. این شوراها از «شورای عالی پشتیبانی جنگ» تا «شورای عالی هماهنگی اقتصادی سران قوا» همگی واجد خصیصهای مشترکند و صرفنظر از ویژگیهای خاصشان، از یک منظر قابل بررسیاند؛ این خصیصه مشترک عبارت است از ایجاد تغییراتی مهم و بنیادین در ترتیبات اصلی حکمرانی و لذا ذیل مفهوم تغییرات قانون اساسی (Constitutional Changes) تحلیل میشوند. قانون اساسی ج.ا.ا، در اصول (58) و (59)، «اعمال قوه مقننه» را «از طریق مجلس شورای اسلامی و نیز «در مسائل بسیار مهم اقتصادی، سیاسی، اجتماعی و فرهنگی ... از راه همهپرسی و مراجعه مستقیم به آرای مردم» منحصر دانسته است. «نمایندگان ملت» نیز بهموجب اصل (62) قانون اساسی، «بهطور مستقیم و با رأی مخفی انتخاب میشوند». نمایندگی که اصل (85)، آن را «قائم به شخص» و غیر«قابل واگذاری به دیگری» میداند. بررسیهای این مقاله نشان میدهد تشکیل و فعالیت شورای عالی فضای مجازی منجر به تغییراتی در ساختار حکمرانی و نیز برخی حقهایی که این اصول آنها را به رسمیت شناخته، شده است. لذا پرسش اصلی این است که آیا تأسیس این شورا و اثرات بهجایگذاشته بر حقوق اساسی ایران را میتوان مصداقی از تغییر قانون اساسی دانست؟
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
Supreme Council of Cyberspace as an Instance of Constitutional Dismemberment in Iran
نویسندگان [English]
- navid sheydaei ashtiani 1
- Bijan Abbasi 2
1 PhD Student of public law, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]
1. Introduction
During more than four decades since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, several councils have been established that have had a significant impact on the country’s constitutional structure. The first of these was the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, created a few months after the Islamic Revolution, when the Islamic Consultative Assembly had not yet begun its activities. Another important example is the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, established by order of the Supreme Leader in 2012 to formulate major policies and decisions related to cyberspace. The influence of these institutions should not be underestimated, as they have directly and indirectly shaped the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Typically, any constitution has two primary functions: defining the organization of state powers and recognizing the fundamental rights and liberties of the people. The changes brought about by these councils touch on both of these aspects. The present study aimed to evaluate the impact of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace on the constitutional framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This council is especially significant because, although the Constitution does not explicitly mention it, it plays a remarkable role in governance. While it appears to act merely as a policymaking body, in practice it sometimes assumes legislative functions—powers that the Constitution does not formally grant it. Therefore, these councils warrant careful attention. Understanding Iran’s constitutional law is impossible without assessing the influence of these councils. They have actually created a living constitution that we live by.
Literature Review
Several articles have offered the legal analysis of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace. These studies include: “The Multiplicity of Legislative Bodies Emphasizing the Position of Supreme Council of Cyberspace Approvals in Iranian Legal System” (Moradkhani & Takaloo, 2021), “The Jurisdiction of the General Board of the Administrative Court of Justice” (Darvishvand, 2023), and “Monitoring the Approvals of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace in the Legal System of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Pirniya & Abrishami-Rad, 2023). These studies address the Council primarily from a constitutional law perspective.
Materials and Methods
The present study employed library research to collect data. Then a descriptive–analytical method was used to analyze the data.
Results and Discussion
The Supreme Council of Cyberspace has dismembered the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran in two significant ways. First, the Constitution guarantees the right to vote and the right to be elected; however, the members of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace are not selected through a public or national election. Second, the Constitution establishes only two valid avenues for lawmaking: through the Islamic Consultative Assembly and, in exceptional cases, by referendum as outlined in Article 59, which states: “In very important economic, political, social, and cultural issues, the exercise of legislative power may be carried out through a referendum and direct reference to the people. The request for a referendum must be approved by two-thirds of all members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.” Accordingly, any imposition of rules or restrictions by institutions acting as legislative bodies, beyond those authorized in Articles 58 and 59, is unconstitutional. Since the Supreme Council of Cyberspace functions in practice as a legislative body, its actions represent a direct dismemberment of the constitutional framework.
Conclusion
The study examined the timing and context of the establishment of the Supreme Cyberspace Council, its structure, and its developments. The analysis outlined the circumstances surrounding the Council’s establishment and highlighted certain conflicts between the Council and other organizations that existed at the time. The concept of constitutional change was also introduced in general terms, and a distinction was made between formal and informal constitutional changes. Finally, the study focused on the concept of constitutional dismemberment and analyzed the effects of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace on Iran’s constitutional order.
کلیدواژهها [English]
- The Supreme Council of Cyberspace
- Constitutional Amendment
- Constitutional Dismemberment
- Constitutional Change
- Legislation
کتابها
- بشیریه، حسین، موانع توسعه سیاسی در ایران، چاپ سیزدهم (تهران: گام نو، 1402).
- راسخ، محمد، نظارت و تعادل در نظام حقوق اساسی، چاپ دوم (تهران: آداک، 1399).
- سلطانی، سیدناصر، درآمدی بر حقوق اساسی نانوشته در ایران (تهران: نگاه معاصر، 1402).
- شریعت پناهی، سیدابوالفضل قاضی، حقوق اساسی و نهادهای سیاسی، چاپ شانزدهم (تهران: میزان، 1400).
- ظریف، محمدجواد، پایاب شکیبایی برداشتهایی از هشت سال وزارت (تهران: اطلاعات، 1402).
مقالهها
- رحمت اللهی، حسین و البرز، فاطمه، «اخلاقیات درونی قانون در اندیشه لون فولر»، تحقیقات حقوقی، دوره 22، شماره 86، (1398).
- راسخ، محمد، «ویژگیهای ذاتی و عرضی قانون»، مجلس و پژوهش، دوره 13، شماره 51، (1385).
- سلطانی، سید ناصر، «یک اصل قانون اساسی؛ دو نظام اقتصادی، تحولات اصل 44 نمونهای از بازنگری غیررسمی در قانون اساسی»، دانشنامه حقوق اقتصادی، دوره 28، شماره 20، (1400).
- سلطانی، سیدناصر، «اعتبارسنجی عرف و رویههای قانون اساسی»، دانش حقوق عمومی، دوره 6، شماره 18، (1396).
- عباسی، بیژن و شیدائی آشتیانی، نوید، «جایگاه شورای عالی هماهنگی اقتصادی سران قوا و مصوبات آن در نظم حقوق اساسی»، تحقیقات حقوقی، دوره 26، شماره 103، (1402).
- مرادخانی، فردین، «بررسی مفهوم رویههای اساسی در حقوق اساسی»، مطالعات حقوقی، دوره 10، شماره 4، (1397).
- نیکونهاد، مهدی و نورایی، حامد، «تعدد مراجع قانونگذاری در جمهوری اسلامی ایران مراجع قانونگذار در نظام حقوق اساسی ج.ا.ا» (گزارش پژوهشی، دفتر مطالعات قانون و قانونگذاری مرکز تحقیقات شورای نگهبان)، تاریخ انتشار: 12/06/1392.
References
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