نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار گروه حقوق عمومی دانشکده علوم انسانی دانشگاه بوعلی سینا، همدان ،ایران
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
1. Introduction
The constitution is one of the most complex concepts in the field of law. A vast body of literature has developed around the history of the concept, its nature and philosophy, its functions and content, and the ways in which constitutions are designed. One important issue in this regard concerns the different types of constitutions. Among these is the authoritarian constitution. With the emergence of constitutionalism and the idea of limiting state power, it became difficult to imagine that a constitution could serve to consolidate the power of authoritarian rulers. Historical experience, however, has demonstrated that authoritarian regimes also have constitutions and often insist on maintaining such a document. As fundamental instruments of governance, constitutions express a state’s political identity, institutional architecture, and underlying values. They also establish the structural distribution of power and define relationships both among state institutions and between the state and its citizens.
The principal aim of constitutionalism is to regulate the exercise of state power through the rule of law and to constrain governmental action. Liberal constitutionalism, in particular, is associated with the separation of powers, democratic elections, and legally enforceable rights. The concept of constitutionalism is so closely intertwined with liberalism that it may be argued that, in the absence of liberal principles, a constitution may struggle to fulfill its fundamental purposes. Because constitutionalism is commonly understood as an antidote to tyranny, some scholars argue that the term constitutionalism appears paradoxical in illiberal states. This, however, does not mean that a constitution cannot be illiberal or authoritarian. In this respect, the present study sought to examine the concept and function of the authoritarian constitution.
2. Literature Review
Following successive waves of democratization, some scholars have argued that constitutionalism itself is undergoing a process of erosion. Others contend that contemporary developments represent the self-destruction of liberal democracy through democratic procedures operating under the formal framework of the rule of law. More than half of the world’s countries remain far removed from the model of constitutional democracy. Many are governed by authoritarian regimes, while others are subject to forms of rule that may be characterized as openly tyrannical. This reality has attracted scholarly attention to the apparent tension between the traditional understanding of constitutions as instruments for limiting state power and their continued existence in systems primarily oriented toward preserving and consolidating such power. The literature therefore raises the question of how constitutions function within authoritarian systems and why constitutions persist despite their potential to constrain state authority
3. Materials and Methods
The present study used a descriptive–analytical method, drawing on the most significant scholarship in the field as well as the constitutional experiences of various countries.
4. Results and Discussion
Why authoritarian states that do not want their power to be limited nevertheless move towards adopting constitutions is an important point of analysis and discussion. The first reason why authoritarian regimes adopt constitutions is that all regimes need to coordinate the roles and responsibilities of different institutions within the government. A written constitution can minimize conflicts among the primary institutions of any regime. All regimes require mechanisms of control, and a constitution can provide such mechanisms.
In authoritarian constitutions, there is often a gap between the promises made in the constitutional text and sociopolitical reality. Moreover, in these countries, there is usually an institution or authority beyond the constitution that holds the real power in the country, creating a significant gap between the constitutional text and the way it is implemented in practice. This gap is generally greater in authoritarian states than in democratic states. Authoritarian regimes are less likely to uphold the rights enshrined in their constitutions and tend to promise to protect and implement such rights for the sake of appearance rather than out of genuine commitment.
Authoritarian regimes and their constitutions can be divided into three types: monarchical, military, and civilian. Authoritarian regimes are rational actors that choose the type of constitution they adopt by balancing the costs and benefits associated with each option. A detailed and descriptive constitution may help an authoritarian regime overcome problems of internal coordination, but it can also expose the regime to delegitimizing criticism from domestic and international audiences.
Authoritarian states are more likely than democratic states to adopt fictitious constitutions that contain a set of basic rights that are not observed in practice. Monarchies and military regimes are more likely than civilian regimes to follow this strategy. Of the three types, civilian regimes have historically been the most common, while monarchies have been the least common. Each type of authoritarian regime is characterized by a distinct power base and a particular structure for resolving internal conflicts, controlling actors outside the regime, and coordinating political actions.
5. Conclusion
Approximately, one-third of the world’s population has never experienced constitutional democracy within open and free societies. Moreover, populist and authoritarian tendencies have contributed to the erosion and, in some cases, the collapse of democratic systems. Global experience demonstrates that constitutions may also serve anti-democratic purposes rather than merely limiting state power. Against this background, the current analysis examined the concept and function of the authoritarian constitution by drawing on the constitutional experiences of various authoritarian countries.
Constitutions in authoritarian countries often exhibit several distinctive characteristics, including the existence of quasi-constitutional arrangements, the establishment of institutions that exist primarily on paper, the limited protection of fundamental rights, and the maintenance of a formal appearance of democratic governance. These features demonstrate that constitutions in authoritarian systems may perform functions that differ significantly from those traditionally associated with constitutionalism and the limitation of state power.
کلیدواژهها English
