نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانش آموخته دکتری حقوق عمومی دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
چکیده
به موجب اصول ۸۷ و ۱۳۳ قانون اساسی، لازم است که رئیس جمهور از مجلس شورای اسلامی برای وزرای خود رأی اعتماد بگیرد. در صورت تغییر نمایندگان مجلس شورای اسلامی در میانه راه دولت، نیاز به تجدید اخذ رای اعتماد برای وزرا نیست. اخذ رای اعتماد برای وزا به صورت فردی و ناظر بر شایستگی‌ها و سوابق شغلی صورت می‌‌گیرد و قواعد اساسی ضامن همسویی سیاسی دولت با مجلس نیست. در صورتی که رئیس جمهور نتواند برای وزرای خود از مجلس رأی اعتماد بگیرد، در اصلِ استقرار دولت خللی وارد نمی‌شود و تنها روند شکل‌گیری دولت با تأخیر صورت می‌‌گیرد و امکان انحلال پارلمان وجود ندارد. مقایسه این موارد با قالب، زمینه سیاسی و اثر عدم أخذ رأی اعتماد در نظام‌های پارلمانی و نیمه‌ریاستی نشان از تفاوت رأی اعتماد در حقوق اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران با مشترک لفظی خود در نظام‌های پارلمانی دارد. در مقابل به نظر می‌رسد که رأی اعتماد در حقوق اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران با نهاد حقوقی فرآیند تأیید انتصابات در نظام‌های ریاستی شباهت بیشتری دارد. مطابقت رأی اعتماد در حقوق اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران با عناصر سه‌گانه موجود در دو نهاد حقوقی مزبور، فرضیه فوق را ثابت می‌کند.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
Revisiting the Nature of Investiture Vote in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Comparative Analysis with the Appointment Confirmation Process
نویسنده [English]
- Seyedeh Zahra Saeid
Ph.D, Public Law College of Farabi University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]
Introduction
In most political systems, parliaments or legislative assemblies play a crucial role in government formation. Oftentimes, the agreement or disagreement within the legislative assembly can determine the success or failure of government formation. Disagreements may either result in the failure to form a government or simply delay its formation. In the former scenario, parliamentary supremacy dictates that disagreement within the parliament may necessitate a re-election. In the latter scenario, while the government maintains authority given its legal status, it may have to compromise on its preferences to avoid the delayed government formation. The investiture vote or vote of confidence, as a legal institution, typically characterizes the first situation in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, whereas the appointment confirmation process mirrors the second scenario in presidential systems.
Articles (87) and (133) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) address the investiture vote or vote of confidence. As stipulated in Article (87), “The President must obtain, for the Council of Ministers, after being formed and before all other business, a vote of confidence from the Assembly.” According to Article (133),
Ministers will be appointed by the President and will be presented to the Assembly for a vote of confidence. With the change of Assembly, a new vote of confidence will not be necessary. The number of Ministers and the jurisdiction of each will be determined by law.
These articles mandate that the government must obtain an investiture vote from the Islamic Consultative Assembly. At first glance, it may appear that the investiture vote outlined in the Constitution seems to be similar to the specific institution of investiture vote in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. However, a comparative analysis reveals nuanced differences. In this respect, the present research aimed to address the following research questions: What legal role does the Islamic Consultative Assembly play in government formation as stated in the Constitution? In other words, does the concept of investiture vote in the Constitution of the IRI align with its specialized usage in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems? The study is based on the hypothesis that there are some distinctions between the investiture vote in the Constitution of the IRI and its counterparts in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems.
Literature Review
A brief analysis of the nature of the investiture vote can be found in a recent article titled “The Parliamentary or Presidential Nature of the Vote of Confidence to the Council of Ministers in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Taghizadeh & Taghizadeh-Chari, 2022). The present study not only confirmed the conclusions of the aforementioned article but also delved into the nature of the investiture vote outlined in the Constitution in more details by identifying the components inherent in the investiture vote and the appointment confirmation process.
Materials and Methods
The present study employed a critical–analytical approach to examine the nature of investiture vote in the Constitution of the IRI and the distinctions between the investiture vote in Iran and analogous processes in other political systems.
Results and Discussion
The findings of the study revealed three important points. First, in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, the investiture vote typically concerns three categories: the entire composition of the cabinet, the head of government, or the government’s program. Different countries based on parliamentary and semi-presidential systems may adopt varying formats of investiture vote, accepting one category or all the three in their legal systems. However, the appointment confirmation process is conducted on an individual basis, focusing on each cabinet member separately. While the Constitution of the IRI refers to the entire composition of the cabinet for the investiture vote, practical challenges necessitate an individual format, thus aligning it more closely with the appointment confirmation process. Second, in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, it is necessary that the government be aligned with the parliamentary majority. Consequently, in case of changes in members of parliament, the government must seek a new investiture vote. This reflects the political context of the investiture vote as a legal institution. In the appointment confirmation process, however, the government’s political alignment with the legislative majority is not obligatory. Instead, the qualification of cabinet members in such systems is primarily based on their competence, resumes, and experiences. Article (133) of the Constitution of the IRI states that the government is not obliged to seek an investiture vote in the event of changes of Assembly. This stipulation, along with the procedure undertaken by members of parliament to scrutinize the qualifications of cabinet members, points towards a non-political context surrounding the investiture vote and its similarity to the appointment confirmation process.
Third, in parliamentary systems, the failure to obtain an investiture vote prevents the formation of government. In some countries, successive failures in securing the investiture vote may lead to the dissolution of parliament. However, in presidential systems, if the president fails to garner the consent of the senate, alternative secretaries may be introduced, ultimately resulting in the formation of the government albeit with a delay. Similarly, in the IRI, the failure to secure an investiture vote does not obstruct the establishment of the government; rather, it simply prolongs the process, potentially leading the president to compromise on proposed ministers in order to expedite government formation. Furthermore, the constitutional requirement to seek an investiture vote for a minister who is removed or resigns, as well as the presidential directive to individually appoint ministers, further emphasizes the resemblance between the investiture vote in the IRI and the appointment confirmation process in presidential systems.
Conclusion
As a conclusion, it seems that the investiture vote in the Constitutional of the IRI bears greater resemblance to the appointment confirmation process observed in presidential systems.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Investiture Vote
- Appointment Confirmation Process
- Ministers
- Dissolution of Parliament
- Government Formation
- Political Context
)